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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between the duration of a vacancy and the start-
ing wage of a new job, using unusually informative data comprising detailed information
on vacancies, the establishments posting the vacancies, and the workers eventually fill-
ing the vacancies. We find that vacancy durations are negatively correlated with the
starting wage and that this negative association is particularly strong with the establish-
ment component of the starting wage. We also confirm previous findings that growing
establishments fill their vacancies faster. To understand the relationship between estab-
lishment growth, vacancy filling and entry wages, we calibrate a model with directed
search and ex-ante heterogeneous workers and firms. We find a strong tension between
matching the sharp increase in vacancy filling for growing firms and the response of
vacancy filling to firm-level wages. We discuss the implications of this finding as well
as potential resolutions.
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1 Introduction
A central question in search-theoretic models of the labor market is how firms and work-
ers form employment relationships. The canonical search and matching model posits the
existence of a matching function, which randomly matches workers and firms, given the
number of vacancies and job seekers in the labor market. Recent evidence by Davis, Faber-
man and Haltiwanger (2013), however, shows that the number of vacancies as measured in
JOLTS survey data is an imperfect predictor of hiring outcomes across U.S. establishments.
Their evidence suggests that firms rely heavily on additional instruments to recruit workers,
which has important implications for aggregate labor market dynamics (Kaas and Kircher,
2015; Gavazza, Mongey and Violante, 2018). Despite this important contribution, many
aspects of vacancy posting and filling are still poorly understood, mainly due to the lack of
detailed microdata.
The aim of this paper is to explore the empirical relation between the duration of a
vacancy and the entry wage of a filled position. Despite the central role of the vacancy filling
rate in search and matching models of the labor market, our empirical knowledge about
the determinants of vacancy durations and their relation to entry wages (and other labor
market outcomes) is very limited. This gap in knowledge is striking given the large body of
empirical evidence on unemployment durations and workers’ re-employment wages and,
more generally, on the role of worker search behavior in the formation of new employment
relationships. To understand the matching process in the labor market, it seems important
to understand both the role of worker and employer behavior. In this paper, we aim to fill
this gap by shedding light on the role of employer behavior for the creation of – and wages
paid in – new job matches.
To study the relationship between vacancy durations and entry wages, we use a linked
dataset comprising information on (i) characteristics and durations of posted vacancies,
(ii) employment of and wages paid by the establishment posting the vacancy, and (iii) the
earnings history of the worker eventually filling the vacancy. The rich information contained
in this dataset allows us to study in detail the vacancy filling patterns and their relation to
wages in newly filled jobs.
The main finding emerging from our empirical analysis is that high-wage establishments
fill their vacancies more quickly. This relationship, however, is masked in the raw data, as
vacancies with long durations tend to be filled with high-wage workers, resulting in a
positive correlation between vacancy durations and wages. Thus, our analysis reveals the
importance of using matched data to distinguish the effect of establishments and matches
from worker-level heterogeneity in the analysis of the determinants of vacancy duration.
We perform a broad set of empirical checks and find our main result to be very robust.
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The evidence allows us to evaluate existing theories of the matching process. The
canonical search and matching model with random search and wage bargaining cannot
account for the empirical observations that high-wage firms face shorter vacancy durations,
as it predicts that firms that face tighter labor markets pay higher wages but also experience
longer vacancy durations. Instead, our evidence points to theories where firms face a trade-
off between paying higher wages and facing longer vacancy spells. Most notably, theories
of directed search where firms post a wage and workers direct their search towards the
more desirable sub-markets are better suited to explain the evidence (Moen, 1997). As
recently shown by Kaas and Kircher (2015), these theories have important implications for
the evolution of aggregate matching efficiency and fluctuations of starting wages over the
business cycle. We reassess these issues in the light of our evidence.
The vacancy data come from the Austrian public labor market administration (“Arbeits-
marktservice”, AMS), which contains the universe of vacancies posted through the AMS
platform. The AMS is by far the most important platform of vacancy posting by Austrian es-
tablishments and covers almost 60% (!) of all vacancies posted by Austrian establishments.1
The AMS vacancy dataset contains an (anonymized) employer-identifier which allows us
to link the posting establishment to the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). The link
at the establishment level allows us to study AMS vacancy posting by Austrian establish-
ments in a very similar way as Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (DFH 2013) did for all
US vacancies using JOLTS data. For vacancies that were filled through direct mediation of
the AMS, the information on vacancy durations and -characteristics can be linked to the
earnings history of the worker eventually filling the vacancy. We exploit the link at the
worker level to study the association between vacancy durations and entry wages.2
We argue that our analysis is interesting not only for the Austrian labor market, but also
for a better understanding of vacancy posting and filling behavior of firms more generally.
1Statistics Austria runs a large quarterly vacancy survey (“Offene Stellen Erhebung”) providing evidence
on vacancy posting by Austrian establishment on all platforms. The survey asks, for each single vacancy
reported by the sampled establishment, whether the vacancy was posted on the AMS platform. On average,
57% of vacancies were posted at the AMS. During the period 2009 to 2017 the AMS coverage rate was 57%
and fluctuated between 53% (2009) and 61% (2013) without showing a trend.
2The Austrian vacancy database has so far not been extensively used for academic research. Among the
few studies exploiting these data is the study of Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller (2015) on market externalities
of UI (and who use the AMS vacancy data to determine which workers are competing for the same vacancies);
and work in progress by Card, Colella and Lalive (2018) on gender discrimination in vacancy posting and
-filling. See also Riese and Bruckbauer (1987) for an early descriptive study using individual vacancy data
from the Austrian public employment service. Mueller, Osterwalder and Zweimüller (2018) describe the
potential of the AMS vacancy database for labor market research and provide a detailed description of the
AMS vacancy database and its link to the ASSD. The ASSD has been extensively used in previous studies (see
e.g. Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller (2006); Card, Chetty and Weber (2007); Card, Lee, Pei and Weber (2015);
Alvarez, Borovickova and Shimer (2016); Borovickova and Shimer (2018)). For a detailed description of the
ASSD, see Zweimüller et al. (2009).
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First, the possibility to link information on vacancy durations and -characteristics to infor-
mation on the wage of the worker filling the vacancy provides the opportunity to shed new
light on a central prediction of search models where firms post a wage. In these models,
employers face a trade-off between paying a high wage and filling a vacancy quickly versus
paying a low wage but having to search longer until the vacancy is filled. This includes
theories of directed search (Moen, 1997) as well as random search (Burdett and Mortensen,
1998) with the central assumption that firms post a wage or commit to a wage offer before
meeting the worker. Directed search theory predicts that firms posting higher wages at-
tract more applicants, whereas theories based on random search predict that firms offering
higher wages face a higher probability of the offer being accepted. While search models
with wage posting have become important theoretical frameworks in labor and macroeco-
nomics, evidence on predictions of these theories in general – and the trade-off between
vacancy durations and entry wages in particular – is very scarce. Faberman and Menzio
(2018) is the only paper we are aware of that has studied this trade-off. They find a positive
correlation in data from the Earnings and Opportunities Pilot Project (EOPP) in the U.S. in
the early 1980s.3 Our research builds on theirs and assesses the extent to which the positive
correlation is confounded by the presence of worker heterogeneity. Our analysis is partic-
ularly well suited to address this issue because we observe the entire labor market history
of the workers matched to a vacancy and thus can use wage and employment histories as
additional controls. Moreover, for a subset of workers in our data, we observe multiple un-
employment spells and thus we can assess the within-person correlation of starting wages
and vacancy durations faced by the establishments hiring the worker. A second reason why
our results are of more general interest is that the patterns of vacancy posting and hiring by
Austrian establishments are similar to those in other countries, even in countries with quite
different labor market institutions. In fact, comparing vacancy patterns in the Austrian data
to US evidence by DFH (2013) shows a surprising degree of similarity. For instance, hiring
and separations rates of Austrian establishments are of a similar order of magnitude as those
of the US. Similar to DFH (2013) we find: (i) growing establishments do not only generate
more hires per vacancies but also fill their vacancies more quickly, (ii) vacancy rates and
vacancy yields (= hires per vacancy) vary strongly with the establishments’ industry, size
and employment turnover, (iii) more than 30% of workers are employed in establishments
that do not hire any worker in a given month, (iv) a large fraction of establishments posting
no vacancy at the end of the previous month hire workers in the subsequent month and (v)
the majority of vacancies are posted by establishments that post more than one vacancy in
the same month.
3Interestingly, Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991) find in the same data set that vacancies from firms in
high-wage industries and larger firms attract a higher number of job applications.
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A third reason why our analysis is of more general interest relates to the information
content and quality of our data. The Austrian vacancy data provide information, on a
daily basis, on the vacancy posting date, the desired start date of the job (= date when the
job become available), and the vacancy filling date. This allows us not only to estimate
the vacancy filling rate quite precisely. We also show that about 25% of all vacancies are
filled before the desired start date. Moreover, AMS staff frequently checks with the posting
establishment on inactive vacancies and documents in the data when a vacancy lapses.
Hence the AMS job posting site is not plagued with inactive (“phantom”) vacancies that
have been found important in privately operated job posting sites (Albrecht, Decreuse and
Vroma, 2017). The richness of the AMS data also leads to alternative vacancy concepts
(including the JOLTS concept), which we will discuss in detail below.
The evidence that emerges from our empirical analysis is that, with sufficient controls for
worker heterogeneity, the correlation between vacancy durations and starting wages turns
from positive to negative. This is particularly evident when we control for worker fixed
effects in regression analysis, comparing the outcomes of the matching process for the same
individual across different unemployment spells. We go one step further by decomposing
wages into fixed worker- and establishment-characteristics using the technique proposed
by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (AKM). This allows us to look at the association
between the vacancy duration to the establishment- , worker- and residual-components of
the starting wage. Our results show two underlying opposing forces: On the one hand, it
takes longer to fill a vacancy for establishments targeting workers in the high-wage segment
of the labor market. On the other hand, we find that vacancies with higher starting wages
are filled more quickly. We show that this negative association is particularly strong with the
establishment component of the starting wage. Viewed through the lens of search theory,
the latter result implies that establishment wage effects are more tightly correlated with the
value of a job accruing to the worker than the residual component of the starting wage.
To understand better the relationship between vacancy filling and posted wages, we
calibrate a model with directed search, posted wages and ex-ante heterogeneous workers
and firms. The model of Kaas and Kircher (2015) is a natural starting point, as it characterizes
directed search in the context of firm heterogeneity and was calibrated explicitly to match
the facts documented in DFH (2013). In their model, posted wages act as a recruitment
device. Firms that want to grow fast post higher wages to reduce the time to fill a vacancy.
We enrich the model of Kaas and Kircher by allowing for ex-ante worker heterogeneity.
This allows us to match the empirical finding that it takes longer for firms to hire high-
wage workers. Qualitatively, our model also matches the empirical finding of a negative
relationship between firm-level wages and vacancy duration. Quantitatively, however, the
model predicts an elasticity that is at least an order of magnitude larger than in the data. It
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is possible to calibrate the model differently to do better in this dimension, but only at the
cost of not matching the evidence in DFH on the relationship between vacancy filling and
firm growth. The implication of this finding is quite clear: the measured elasticity between
establishment-level wages and vacancy durations is an order of magnitude too small to
account for substantial variations of matching efficiency across establishments, and thus the
evidence points to theories that allow for measures of recruiting effort that do not rely on
the starting wage, as in Gavazza, Mongey and Violante (2018). We also discuss potential
extensions of the model of Kaas and Kircher (2015) that may resolve the tension between
matching the patterns in DFH and our paper.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the related empirical literature and
Section 3 discusses the institutional background. Section 4 introduces the data, discusses the
vacancy duration concepts, and discusses the procedure linking vacancy data to employer-
employee data. Section 5 replicates previous evidence on vacancy posting, hiring, and
employment growth in our linked data set. Section 6 analyses the relationship between
vacancy duration and entry wages. Section 7 sets up the model and confronts its predictions
with the data. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Empirical Literature
Our contribution relates to a number of studies of vacancy behavior. With data from the
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for the US, DFH (2013) show that faster
growing establishments not only post more vacancies but also exhibit a higher vacancy
yield, i.e. a higher number of realized hires per vacancy. The latter finding has attracted
considerable attention as it suggests that firms use other channels to recruit workers if
they quickly expand their workforce, and a reduction in aggregate recruiting intensity may
be responsible for the shift of the U.S. Beveridge Curve during the Great Recession. We
replicate the findings of DFH in our vacancy data from Austria. We find that the relationship
between firm growth and the vacancy yield is surprisingly similar to the one documented
by DFH in the JOLTS data. Since the JOLTS has only been available since December 2000,
many earlier studies focused on the Help Wanted Index (Abraham (1983); Abraham (1987);
Blanchard and Diamond (1989)). While Shimer (2005) and Barnichon (2010) note that the
Help Wanted Index tracks the movements in the JOLTS quite well when accounting for the
negative long-term trend in newspaper advertising, it does not allow for an analysis at the
micro level.
Micro studies of vacancy posting behavior are mainly based on survey (e.g. DFH; van
Ours and Ridder (1991); van Ours and Ridder (1992); Holzer (1994); Gorter, Nijkamp and
6
Rietveld (1996); Burdett and Cunningham (1998); Dickerson (2003); Davis, Röttger, Warning
and Weber (2014); Faberman and Menzio (2018)) or online job board data (e.g. Barron,
Berger and Black (1999); Banfi and Villena-Roldan (2016); Marinescu and Wolthoff (2016);
Marinescu (2017); Modestino, Shoag and Ballance (2017); Hershbein and Kahn (2018); see
also Kuhn (2014) for a general discussion of internet job search). A few earlier studies
also use administrative data on vacancies, e.g. Coles and Smith (1996) use Job Centre
data recording the stock of vacancies for 257 regions in the UK. Berman (1997) and Yashiv
(2000) analyze Israeli administrative data on vacancies, which record stocks and flows of
vacancies. Andrews, Bradley, Stott and Upward (2008) analyze administrative data for one
labor market in the UK on vacancies intended for youths (aged between 15 and 18). Sunde
(2007) uses German administrative data on yearly stocks of vacancies that are disaggregated
according to 40 occupation groups.
Compared to existing datasets on vacancies that we are aware of, our data have several
advantages: First and foremost, none of the studies match the vacancy data to either the
employment history of the matched worker or to firm data. Second, while most of the men-
tioned studies were mainly based on survey or career services data, we have administrative
data, which should decrease the extent of measurement error due both to more accurate data
and a larger sample size. The mentioned studies that do use administrative data are mostly
based on aggregated data. One exception is Andrews, Bradley, Stott and Upward (2008)
who covers the labor market for teenagers for one region of the UK. Third, datasets usually
record repeated stocks of vacancies, such as the most prominent example, the JOLTS, which
records the stock of vacancies at the end of the month. This poses the problem that vacancies
with short durations (opened and closed between two survey rounds) are under-sampled
(length-biased sampling/aggregation bias), which is especially severe as vacancies with very
short durations will turn out to be quantitatively relevant. This problem does not arise in
our data as every vacancy is recorded, irrespective of its length. Finally, a few recent studies
provide interesting findings on the relationship between number of applications and the
posted wage (in particular, see Marinescu and Wolthoff (2016) and Banfi and Villena-Roldan
(2016)). This is interesting because, in models of directed search, a higher number of appli-
cations is the channel through which firms are able to fill vacancies more quickly. Unlike
our dataset, the above empirical analyses do not directly observe the duration of a vacancy,
which is the key variable entering the firm’s posting and recruiting decisions. The fact that
our data contain precise information on the duration of a vacancy allows for a much more
straightforward mapping from empirics to theory, particularly in regards to the quantitative
predictions of models of directed search.
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3 Institutional Background
In this section, we discuss the institutional background relevant for our analysis of vacancy
durations and entry wages. Since we are looking at vacancies posted at the Austrian public
employment service (“Arbeitsmarktservice”, AMS) we start with a brief discussion of the role
of the AMS as a player on the Austrian labor market. We then discuss institutions and
relevant features of the wage setting process in Austria.
3.1 The AMS on the Austrian Labor Market
The AMS is by far the most important job-matching platform in Austria, comprising almost
60% of all vacancies posted by Austrian firms. The mission of the AMS is bringing together
job seekers and employers and reducing search frictions on the labor market to a minimum.
Targeted workers include both employed or unemployed workers looking for a job as well
firms with open vacancies of all kinds. AMS services are free of charge, both for workers
and for firms.
The AMS is organized in one federal, nine state and 104 local (labor market district)
offices. Social partners (employer federations and worker organizations) are involved at all
levels and instrumental in monitoring the organization’s corporate governance. Social part-
ners are also involved in designing labor market policies, including measures to improve the
efficiency of the matching process (such as “eAMS,” the implementation and improvement
of online services).
Besides its central role as a mediator between workers and employers on the Austrian
labor market, the AMS administers income support programs (UI benefits, unemployment
assistance, and related transfers) and is in charge of providing and organizing active labor
market policies.4 In 2017, the AMS employed 6,284 (5,606 full-time equivalent) workers.
AMS staff managed income support payments of about 6.2 billion Euros and active labor
market policy subsidies (for 364,000 job seekers) of about 1.3 billion Euros. Together with
the budget of the AMS organization (0.9 billion Euros), total expenditures administered
through the AMS amounted to 8.2 billion Euros or 2.2% of Austrian GDP (see AMS (2018)).
3.2 The Wage Setting Process in Austria
Wage setting in Austria is subject to collective bargaining agreements that cover about
95% of Austrian workers. These agreements are the outcome of negotiations between
4An additional task of the AMS is the economy-wide management of the admission process of immigrants
to the Austrian labor market.
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unions and employer associations at the industry level. Importantly for our purpose, these
collective bargaining agreements only set wage floors. Ultimately, wages are determined by
supplementary establishment bargaining as well as bilaterally between workers and firms.5
As a consequence most wages are substantially above the wage floor. For instance, Leoni and
Pollan (2013) study “overpayments” (the ratio of effective wages over collectively bargained
wages). They find that, in the years when the regional extended benefit program was in place
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, effective wages of blue collar workers were, on average,
between 20 to 25% above the collectively bargained minimum wages. Unfortunately, the
ASSD does not contain information that would allow a mapping of a wage observation to the
corresponding collective bargaining agreement. There are more than 400 such agreements
per year and wage floor vary across bargaining units. Some of our (low-) wage observations
will therefore be bound by these agreements, which is likely to bias our results towards zero.6
4 Data and Conceptual Issues
Here we start with describing the AMS vacancy database, focusing in particular on the
information on the timing and characteristics of AMS vacancies. The rich information on
vacancy timing raises conceptual issues relating to the measurement of the vacancy duration
of a vacancy, which we discuss in the following subsection. Finally, we describe how we link
AMS vacancies to establishment- and worker information from the social security register
(ASSD). This link will eventually allow us to analyze the association between vacancy
durations and entry wages.
4.1 The AMS Vacancy Database
The AMS vacancy register database, explained in detail in Mueller, Osterwalder and
Zweimüller (2018), contains information on all vacancies posted through the AMS and
covers the years 1987-2014. The data quality has been initially low but substantially im-
proving over time. In what follows, our analysis focuses on the period 1997-2014, as for
these years all the variables of interest for our analysis are available, including industry
codes and worker-level identifiers that allow matching to the ASSD.
5Moreover, Austrian collective bargaining agreements often feature clauses that require actually paid wages
to rise in lockstep with the wage growth of the wage floors, although some some clauses specify lower wage
growth. In the context of the present analysis this is less relevant because we concentrate on entry wages in
newly formed job matches which are not constrained by these latter agreements, which only apply to ongoing
employment relationships.
6Indeed, our robustness analysis in the Appendix reveals that the results become slightly stronger when
we trim the sample at the 5th and 95th percentile (see Tables A8 and A13).
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A particular advantage of the AMS vacancy register is the detailed (daily) information
on vacancy timing. More precisely, the data contain: (i) the date when the vacancy is
posted, (ii) the desired start date of the job, and (iii) the date when the vacancy is filled (or
put off the system for other reasons). In addition to the timing and duration of a vacancy,
the data report job characteristics and skill requirements, as well as characteristics of the
firm posting the vacancy such as the region, industry and firm size. The information on
timing and duration of a vacancy corresponds to three different outcomes. First, a vacancy
posted at the AMS can either result in a hiring directly mediated by the AMS. In this case,
a personal worker identifier is recorded in the data, which gives the identity of the worker
who fills the vacancy. A second outcome is that the firm ends up hiring a worker outside the
AMS system. This will happen if the firm does not only rely exclusively on the AMS as a
search platform but also employs other search channels (other internet platform, newspaper
ads, etc.). In the latter case, the personal identifier for the worker who fills the vacancy is
unknown, but the vacancy duration is reported in the vacancy data. The third possibility is
that the vacancy lapses, either because it has become obsolete or because the firm cannot be
contacted any longer. Around 14% of all vacancies never result in a hire. Of the remaining
vacancies, around 27% are hired through the AMS system while 73% are filled through a
different channel (see Table A1 in the Appendix). In correspondence with the AMS, we
verified that the AMS frequently follows up – at least once every two weeks – with the
firm posting the vacancy regarding the status of the vacancy. Taken together, this suggests
that the AMS job posting site is plagued much less with issues related to inactive vacancies
than in privately operated job posting sites (see Albrecht, Decreuse and Vroman (2017) for
a theoretical analysis of this issue). Another strength of the AMS vacancy data is that it
separately records outcomes for vacancies for multiple workers, see Table A1 and Figure A1
in the Appendix. Vacancies with at least one other identical vacancy account for one third
of all vacancies in the AMS vacancy data base.
One obvious concern is that the vacancies that firms post on the AMS platform are not a
representative window of the universe of vacancies posted by Austrian firms. To assess this
potential concern, we compare the number of vacancies in the vacancy register with the total
number of vacancies based on a representative vacancy survey (“Offene-Stellen-Erhebung”
OStE, akin to the JOLTS) and conducted by Statistik Austria since 2009. Figure 1 shows that
the AMS- and OStE vacancy stocks co-move very closely, with a correlation coefficient of
0.89. While the similarity of the two time-series is reassuring, calculating an AMS coverage
rate (= AMS-stock / OStE-stock) is problematic because the underlying vacancy concepts are
different.7 Fortunately, the OStE survey provides direct information whether or not a given
7The vacancy concept underlying the OStE survey is more vague than the vacancy concept underlying
AMS stock. The AMS stock displayed in Figure 1 includes all posted vacancies, including those that are not
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Figure 1: AMS Vacancy Data vs. Representative Vacancy Survey Data
vacancy is posted through the AMS platform. The fraction of vacancies posted at the AMS
– as observed in the OStE survey – is (by construction) based on the same vacancy concept
and thus gives us a reasonably accurate coverage rate. During the period 2009 to 2017, the
share of vacancies posted at the AMS fluctuated 57% and 61% (2013) without showing any
trend. Edelhofer and Knittler (2013) show that AMS vacancies are by and large (though
not perfectly) representative for all vacancies posted by Austrian firms. In particular, AMS
vacancies are more concentrated on occupations in the middle of the skill spectrum and
have somewhat lower education requirements than vacancies not posted via the AMS.
4.2 Measuring the Duration of AMS Vacancies
A first issue to be clarified is the definition of a vacancy and how we measure a vacancy’s
duration. Our starting point is the BLS’s definition of an open position, which is applied in
the collection of the JOLTS data and specifies that a job is open only if it meets all three of
the following conditions: (1) A specific position exists and there is work available for that
position, (2) the job could start within 30 days, and (3) there is active recruiting for workers
from outside the establishment location that has the opening. These conditions were set in
analogy to how the BLS and the ILO define and measure unemployment.
The analogy of the BLS’s definition to AMS’s vacancy data is not straightforward. The
AMS vacancy data contains a measure of vacancy duration, measured in days, defined as
the difference between the date the vacancy is filled and the desired start date of the job (=
immediately available. In contrast, the OStE stock includes vacancies that are “available within a certain
period”. This implies that the latter stock is based on a more narrow definition than the former, thus
overestimating the AMS coverage rate.
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the date when the job becomes available). In what follows, we refer to this concept as the
AMS duration. This is similar to the concepts of a vacancy in JOLTS, except that the job must
be immediately available rather than within the next 30 days. To gain a more comprehensive
view of vacancy filling, we define two alternative vacancy durations: the JOLTS duration,
which measures the duration since posting, but at most 30 days in advance of the date
of availability; and the Posting duration, which measures the (unrestricted) duration since
posting. To be more precise, let’s define the date when the vacancy is posted in the AMS
as tposted, the date when the job becomes available as tavailable and the date when the vacancy
is filled as t f illed. Then, the three vacancy concepts translate into the following duration
measures:
1. AMS duration: dAMS ≡ max
{
t f illed − tavailable, 0
}
2. JOLTS duration: dJOLTS ≡ max
{
t f illed −max{tposted, tavailable − 30}, 0
}
3. Posting duration: dPosting ≡ t f illed − tposted
The AMS data contain dAMS for the entire sample period, measured in days. However, the
exact (daily) date of tposted, tavailable, and t f illed is available not before 2007. Before 2007, we
know tposted, tavailable, and t f illed only at monthly precision. To have a comparable measure for
the full length of the sample period, we approximate these dates for the earlier period by
the 15th of each month and compute the JOLTS and posting vacancy duration measures
accordingly.8
Note that it is not a priori clear, which vacancy concept should be applied for our analysis.
Ideally, vacancy duration (just like unemployment duration) should measure the duration
of the recruiting (search) spell. Thus, if a firm posts a vacancy but does not actively try to fill
it or cannot fill it because it is posted too far in advance of the date of availability, it should
not be counted as part of the vacancy stock. However, it is difficult to draw the line in
practice since recruiting effort is not directly observable. Our analysis below uses all three
vacancy duration measures. We want to stress that a key advantage of our data is that we
can accurately calculate the daily vacancy filling rate without imposing any assumptions.
This is different from previous studies (such as DFH) relying on repeated observations of
the vacancy stock, which cannot observe the vacancy filling rate directly but have to impose
assumptions to infer this rate from stock samples and total hires.
8We checked whether this approximation may lead to biased estimates of vacancy durations. It turns out
that there is little difference between the exact and proxied JOLTS- and the Posting duration measures for the
period 2007-2014, where the relevant dates are observed at daily precision (see Appendix Figure A3). See also
Elsby, Michaels and Ratner (2015) for a more detailed discussion of the concept of a vacancy in the JOLTS.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Different Measures of Vacancy Duration
Vacancy Duration Concept
A. All filled vacancies AMS JOLTS Posting
Mean days 30.8 41.3 48.2
Median days 15.0 30.0 33.0
Percent with duration = 0 days 24.2 7.6 5.8
Percent with duration = 1-7 days 13.0 9.1 8.7
Percent with duration = 8-30 days 30.8 37.0 31.0
Percent with duration = 31-90 days 24.4 37.0 41.3
Percent with duration > 90 days 7.5 9.3 13.3
B. Filled vacancies,
intermediated through the AMS only AMS JOLTS Posting
Mean days 19.0 27.8 33.9
Median days 7 19 20
Percent with duration = 0 days 33.5 13.4 12.6
Percent with duration = 1-7 days 19.6 16.4 16.2
Percent with duration = 8-30 days 29.3 41.2 34.1
Percent with duration = 31-90 days 13.9 24.5 29.5
Percent with duration > 90 days 3.7 4.4 7.6
Notes: Authors’ tabulations with the AMS universe for the years 1997-2014. Lapsed
vacancies are excluded for this tabulation.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the three different vacancy duration concepts among
the set of vacancies that are eventually filled (i.e., do not lapse).9 Panel A of the table looks
at all filled vacancies, while Panel B looks at vacancies filled through mediation of the AMS.
For the universe of AMS vacancies, it turns out the average AMS duration is 30.8 days, the
average JOLTS duration is 41.3 days, and the average Posting duration is 48.2 days. Panel
B looks at the same indicators when only vacancies eventually filled through mediation of
the AMS are considered. It turns out that, irrespective of the particular vacancy measure,
vacancies filled with AMS mediation last substantially shorter.
An important reason for the shorter duration of vacancies filled through mediation of
the AMS is delayed reporting. Vacancies filled through the AMS system are tracked in real
time and the recorded filling date typically corresponds to the true filling date. Information
on vacancies filled outside the AMS system is collected by AMS staff who frequently checks
up with the posting establishment. Since AMS staff only checks whether the vacancy is still
9The statistics look very similar when we restrict the sample to the years 2007 and later, where the JOLTS
and Posting duration is measured in exact days.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Different Measures of Vacancy Duration
active or not (rather than the filling or lapsing date), the recorded filling date is typically later
than the true filling date, leading to systematically longer vacancy durations for vacancies
filled outside the system.10 Another potential reason why durations are shorter for vacancies
mediated through the AMS is that firms post vacancies at the AMS and only turn to other
recruiting channels if the search through the AMS was not successful, though it seems just
as plausible that the opposite holds true.
The three vacancy concepts show a very strong correlation over time, both at seasonal
and business-cycle frequency. This is shown in Figure 2. The correlation coefficient of the
quarterly average of the AMS vacancy duration and the Posting duration is 0.81 and the
correlation coefficient of the AMS vacancy duration and the JOLTS duration is 0.97.11
The vacancy timing information in the AMS data allows us to explore how vacancy
filling varies with the duration of a vacancy. To shed light on this question, Figure 3
draws the vacancy filling hazard against “time to job availability”, which is defined as
d˜ = t f illed − tavailable. Notice that d˜ coincides with AMS duration for positive values of d˜,
but counts a duration as negative when it is filled prior to the date of availability (when
10Comparing Panels A and B of Table 1 shows that the difference is larger for JOLTS and Posting durations
than for AMS duration. This is consistent with AMS staff following up immediately available vacancies more
frequently than vacancies that are not yet available, leading to larger reporting delay for not immediately
available vacancies. Delayed reporting can also explain why the discrepancy is smaller for JOLTS duration
than for Posting duration, as the latter measure is based on a broader vacancy stock (with a larger fraction of
not immediately available vacancies).
11In the Appendix Figures A4 and A5, we also show that he vacancy filling rate observed in our data exhibits
realistic business-cycle patterns, with an elasticity with respect to the labor market tightness of between -0.37
and -0.47, which is consistent with estimates of the matching function. Vacancy lapses do not appear to have
any systematic correlation with labor market tightness or the unemployment rate, as is evident from Figure
A6 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Vacancy-Filling Hazard, Relative to the Date of Availability of the Job
AMS duration is zero). d˜ is zero for vacancies posted and filled at the desired start date.12
Figure 3 shows how the weekly filling rate varies with d˜. The graph reveals that the filling
rate gradually increases before, peaks at, and gradually falls after the desired start date.13
Clearly, these dynamic patterns reflect both duration dependence and heterogeneity and it
is not possible to disentangle these two factors.14
Figure 4 plots the cumulative fraction of posted vacancies (Panel a) and the cumulative
fraction of filled and lapsed vacancies (Panel b) against d˜. Panel (a) reveals that two thirds of
AMS vacancies are posted before the desired start date, and roughly one quarter are posted
earlier than one month before that date. Panel (b) shows that a non-negligible fraction of
AMS vacancies are filled (while very few lapse) before the desired start date. The vast
majority (85 percent) of AMS vacancies gets eventually filled. In sum, Figures 3 and 4 show
12When calculating the filling rate as in Figure 3, we have to take into account that different vacancies start
out at different points in time. Specifically, the vacancy-filling hazard after τ periods relative to the desired
start date is given by λ(τ) = limh→0[Pr(τ ≤ d˜ ≤ τ + h)/h]/[Pr(tposted − tavailable ≤ τ ≤ d˜)], where we only count
vacancies after they were posted, i.e. τ ≥ tposted − tavailable, at any given time τ.
13Appendix Figure A2 shows similar patterns for the vacancy lapse hazard.
14True negative duration dependence in vacancy filling rates may arise in the presence of stock-flow match-
ing (Coles and Smith, 1998), in the presence of phantom vacancies (Albrecht, Decreuse and Vroman, 2017) or
due to non-sequential search where employers select a pool of applicants and then make a job offer (Davis
and Samaniego de la Parra, 2017). Dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity arises when there are
vacancies with an intrinsically high filling rate that leave the sample early while the “surviving” vacancies at
longer duration exhibit low filling rates. For examples of models with heterogeneous filling rates, see Davis
(2001), where vacancies for high-productivity jobs exhibit higher filling rates, or Kaas and Kircher (2015),
where fast-growing firms post higher wages to attract more applicants. There could also be positive dynamic
selection before the desired start date as firms expecting a low filling rate could increase the probability of
filling their vacancy by the desired start date by posting early, which could explain part of the upward slope
to the left of the desired start date.
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that early posting and filling are quantitatively relevant. This is interesting per se and points
to a margin of employment adjustment that has so far not been recognized.
4.3 Linking AMS vacancies to the ASSD
In the empirical analysis below, we will primarily focus on the empirical association of
vacancy durations and entry wages. This is based on a dataset linking AMS vacancies
to information on workers and establishments from the Austrian social security database
(ASSD). The ASSD, explained in detail in Zweimüller, Winter-Ebmer, Lalive, Kuhn, Wuell-
rich, Ruf and Büchi (2009), is a linked employer-employee dataset and covers the universe
of all private sector workers (about 80% of the total workforce) from 1972 onwards. The
ASSD collects all information necessary to verify old-age pension claims. For this purpose,
it records the complete earnings- and employment history for each worker. Moreover, the
ASSD provides information on unemployment insurance spells, and spells on other social
insurance programs (sickness, disability, etc.) and also includes a limited set of worker and
establishment characteristics.
To construct our linked vacancy-employer-employee dataset, we exploit AMS informa-
tion on the identity of (i) the establishment posting the vacancy and (ii) the worker eventually
filling the vacancy. We proceed in two steps. First, we use the information on establishment
identifiers both in the ASSD and AMS vacancy data, and the mapping translating them.
However, the mapping is not unambiguous. Below we confine the analysis to the set of
unique matches, covering around 54 per cent of all identifiers recorded in the vacancy data.
In a second step, we exploit information in the AMS vacancy data on the identity (= the
16
anonymized social security number) of the worker filling the vacancy. This information is
available for hires mediated through the AMS, which happens to be the case for about 25%
of all AMS vacancies. These AMS vacancies can be linked to ASSD information on earnings
and employment of the worker filling the vacancy.15
The above procedure yields two linked vacancy-employer-employee datasets: (i) the
“firm sample”, based on an establishment identifier in the AMS vacancy data that can be
unambiguously linked to the ASSD; and (ii) the “worker sample”, based on an unambiguous
person identifier in both datasets. By construction, the latter sample is a subset of the
former (as many vacancies are eventually not filled through AMS mediation, in which
case no person identifier is recorded). The firm sample links AMS vacancy information
to ASSD information on the establishments’ employment dynamics (employment, hirings,
separations, etc.). Inter alia, we can observe all hires after an establishment has posted
a vacancy on the AMS platform. The worker sample links AMS vacancy information to
the ASSD earnings- and employment history of the worker filling a vacancy. This latter
information allows us to study the association between vacancy durations and entry wages.
To check the quality of the linking procedure, we compare vacancy characteristics in
the linked firm- and worker samples to the AMS universe to vacancy characteristics in the
AMS universe. This is a check whether the linkable vacancies are a representative subset
of the AMS universe. In Table 2, we report summary statistics, comparing the universe
of vacancies to our matched subsamples.16 In moving from the AMS universe to the firm
sample, we exclude non-linkable vacancies leaving us with 54.2% of the vacancies in the
AMS universe. In addition, we exclude vacancies for part-time jobs from our matched
subsamples to limit any issues regarding the hours margin in our wage analysis, since the
ASSD only measures daily but not hourly wages. In moving from the firm sample to the
worker sample, we only include vacancies resulting in a hire through mediation of the AMS
system where a worker identifier was available leaving us with 20.1% of the vacancies in
the firm sample.17 While the worker sample – the sample used to explore vacancy durations
and entry wages – is substantially smaller than the AMS universe, the descriptive statistics
suggest that it is not that different in terms of vacancy characteristics. Overall, the evidence
in 2 suggests that the linking procedure works well and is unlikely to be contaminated by the
fact that a large number of AMS vacancies cannot be linked due to missing establishment- or
15The main reason for the non-uniqueness of the matching is that the vacancy register and the ASSD use a
different firm/establishment logic, which is a not an uncommon problem with data sources stemming from
different data providers.
16In line with published statistics of Statistik Austria, we exlcude vacancies for apprenticeships, vacancies
from firms in agriculture and fishing, and extraterritorial organizations from the data. The data with these
sample restrictions closely replicates the official time series on AMS vacancies published by Statistik Austria.
17We also exclude observations where the observed starting wage was zero (69 cases).
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Table 2: Vacancy Characteristics: AMS Universe vs. Matched Subsamples
AMS Universe Firm Sample Worker Sample
Vacancy Characteristics
At least apprenticeship (%) 50.3 54.2 48.4
Permanent contract (%) 78.4 72.9 79.4
Hired through system (%) 23.3 23.3 100.0
Fixed working time (%) 21.2 23.9 28.2
Full time (%) 75.2 100.0 100.0
Small firm (%) 44.6 41.8 41.7
Vienna (%) 17.0 12.0 8.7
Major Industries
Manufacturing (%) 10.3 12.1 16.8
Construction (%) 7.0 10.0 12.5
Wholesale and Retail (%) 14.8 10.8 13.8
Accommodation and Food (%) 23.3 31.2 23.1
Real Estate, Professional, and Admin (%) 26.1 26.0 21.8
Vacancies 5,354,139 2,183,199 439,341
Establishments 269,157 93,400 61,232
Notes: Authors’ tabulations of the vacancy register data for the years 1997-2014. A small firm is defined in the
vacancy register data as a firm with 1-10 employees.
person identifiers.18 In particular, the worker sample looks quite similar to the full sample
of vacancies in terms required formal education, skills, contract type and size of the posting
firm.
A second check assessing the representativeness of our linked vacancy-employer-employee
dataset compares the establishments posting linkable vacancies to the universe of establish-
ments in the ASSD, which covers all private sector establishments. In Appendix Figure 5,
we plot the distribution of firm-wage effect estimated following Abowd, Kramarz and Mar-
golis (1999). Panels (a) and (b) compare the distribution in the ASSD establishment universe
to the corresponding distributions but considering only establishments in the firm and the
worker subsample, respectively. While we discuss this concept in more detail below, it is
an estimate of the average wage paid in a firm, controlling for observed and unobserved
18The regression samples in Section 6 are usually somewhat smaller than this number because most re-
gressions use the natural logarithm of vacancy duration as the dependent variable, which is not defined for
the sizeable fraction of the sample with a vacancy duration of zero. See further below in this section for a
discussion of this issue. In addition, some control variables are not available for all observations in the worker
sample.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Firm Wage Effects, ASSD Universe vs. Matched Firm and Worker
Samples (Weighted by Average Employment)
worker characteristics. Clearly, the distributions look very similar, with less mass at both
ends of the distributions compared to the ASSD Universe. In Table A2 in the Appendix,
we also checked whether the firm and worker samples are similar to the ASSD universe in
terms of industry composition, employer size and worker turnover. It turns out that the
firm and worker samples are somewhat more concentrated in manufacturing, construction,
retail trade and tourism. Subsamples are also more likely medium sized, while very small
and very large establishments are underrepresented. The subsamples compare very well to
the universe in terms of the distribution across employment turnover categories.
In sum, while many vacancies cannot be linked, the characteristics of linkable vacancies
look very similar to characteristics of theAMSvacancy universe. This suggests that the linking
procedure works and is unlikely invalidated by missing establishment or person identifiers.
However, with respect to industry and firm size the composition of establishments in the
linked samples is somewhat different from the one in the ASSD establishment universe.
This is likely due to either differences in the likelihood to post vacancies or selectivity
in establishments’ propensity to post vacancies on the AMS platform. While this calls
for a cautious interpretation of our results, our main takeaway is that the linked vacancy-
employer-employee data is a highly informative data source for studying vacancy durations
and entry wages. We also probe the robustness of our main findings in Section 6 below
and find that they are not sensitive to controlling for establishment size nor to splitting the
sample by establishment size.
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5 Vacancy Filling and Firm Growth
One of the major contributions of DFH is the finding that, at the firm level, the stock of
vacancies is an insufficient statistic for hiring. Based on JOLTS data they find that growing
firms systematically increase their hiring intensity, leading to more hires for every posted
vacancy. Their results are based on the JOLTS, a monthly survey of the vacancy stocks, gross
hires and separations. As argued above, the JOLTS is subject to aggregation bias, leading to
under-sampling of vacancies with short durations. Moreover, JOLTS does not collect direct
information on the duration of a given vacancy. While DFH compute a daily job filling
rate based on gross hires, separations and vacancy postings and correct for biases due to
time aggregation, it makes sense to reconsider their findings, as our data sample from the
flow and provide a direct measure of job filling. Moreover, it is also interesting to analyze
whether the same patterns emerge in a different labor market setting, such as in Austria.
We calculate the monthly employment growth rates in establishment size using the
ASSD. Following DFH, we calculate growth rates allowing for entries and exits, defined as
gt =
nt − nt−1
0.5(nt + nt−1)
,
where nt denotes the establishment size in period t. We merge these growth rates and the
establishment size to the vacancy register. Following DFH, we define 207 growth rate bins,
allowing for mass points at -2 and 2, choosing the bins to be narrower for growth rates
close to 0. We then calculate the average vacancy-filling rate within these bins. As DFH, we
smooth the results using a centered five-bin moving average.
20
The result of this exercise can be seen in Figure 6.19 We find that same hockey-stick
type pattern as for DFH’s model implied vacancy filling rate: a strong positive relationship
between vacancy filling and employment growth for growing firms and a constant filling
rate for shrinking firms. Quantitatively, the patterns are not as strong as in DFH who find
that the daily job filling rate increases fivefold from 0.05 for shrinking firms to around 0.25
for firms growing 30%, whereas in our data the vacancy filling rate nearly doubles from 0.014
to somewhat above 0.024. This conclusion is confirmed when we compute the elasticity of
job filling rates to gross hires, as shown in Appendix Figure A10. We find a robust positive
relationship, which indicates that firms that hire more workers not only post more vacancies
but also fill a given vacancy faster. The elasticity of the daily filling rate to the hires rate is
substantially smaller in our data, with a value of 0.18 compared to the elasticity of 0.82 in
DFH. It is not clear whether the discrepancy in the magnitude is due to differences in the
measurement of the job filling rate or differences in the labor market setting between the
U.S. and Austria. Unfortunately, we cannot compute DFH’s model implied filling rate and
distinguish between these two hypotheses, because DFH’s method requires the entire stock
of vacancies for a given firm whereas in the AMS data we only observe a subset of vacancies
posted on the AMS website and thus we cannot distinguish the two potential sources of the
discrepancy in the magnitude of the elasticity.20 In any event, we believe a direct measure
of vacancy filling as in the AMS data is preferable. Note that the fact that we only observe
AMS vacancies, shouldn’t bias the elasticity, as long as the filling and hiring patterns are the
same for AMS vacancies as for other job openings. Although we cannot check empirically,
there is no apriori reason to believe that the relationship between vacancy filling and hiring
is different for AMS vacancies and vacancies posted elsewhere.
In summary, the evidence here confirms the view that vacancy postings are not a suffi-
cient statistic for hiring at the firm level and that firms that grow quickly use other recruiting
channels to attract workers.21 Appendix Table A4 also shows patterns of hiring and vacancy
posting in the Austrian data similar to those presented by DFH for the US. While AMS va-
cancy rates tend to be smaller and AMS vacancy yields larger when compared to those from
JOLTS in DFH, this is not surprising as JOLTS measures all vacancies at surveyed establish-
ments whereas the AMS vacancy database only covers vacancies posted at the AMS. This is
also the reason why in our analysis below we focus on outcomes at the vacancy level such
as vacancy duration rather than outcomes at the establishment level such as vacancy yields.
19Appendix Figure A8 shows the same pattern for the sample of immediately available vacancies.
20In the Appendix, we also show the vacancy yield has the same hockey-stick patterns as in DFH, see
Appendix Figure A7. Again, because we don’t observe all vacancies at given firm, we prefer to focus here
directly on the object of interest, which is the rate of vacancy filling.
21Appendix Figure A9 provides evidence that there is no relationship between vacancy lapses and firm
growth.
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Table 3: Additional Statistics on Hires and Vacancies
AMS DFH (2013)
All Immediately
Vacancies Available
Employment at establishments
with no hires in t 38.1 38.1 34.8
Employment at establishments
with no vacancies at end of t-1 75.3 80.3 45.1
Hires in t at establishments
with no vacancies at end of t-1 65.8 73.3 41.6
Vacancies at end of t at establishments
with no vacancies at end of t-1 18.2 21.6 17.9
Notes: Immediately available and all vacancies between 1997–2014 for the firm subsample. Hiring
in period t means hired between period t − 1 and period t. Firmsize is calculated as the sum of all
individuals with qualification 10 or 14 within the same firm identifier. If we record a vacancy but no
firmsize or hiring, we change the relevant value from missing to zero.
Finally, in Table 3 we look at further vacancy and hiring indicators. We find that estab-
lishments with no hires at the monthly frequency account for 38% of employment, which
compares to 35% in DFH. We also find that 75% of employment is in establishments with no
AMS vacancy posted during the previous month; and 66% of employment in establishments
that hire in the current month but did not post an AMS vacancy in the previous month. The
corresponding numbers in DFH are 45% and 42%, respectively. Note that higher numbers
are to be expected in the Austrian data, as AMS vacancies make up only 60 percent of all
posted vacancies. Finally, we find a high degree of persistence in the establishment-level
incidence of AMS vacancies: only 18% of vacancies are posted in establishments with no
vacancy in the previous month, the same magnitude as in DFH.
In the Appendix Table A3, we present further evidence showing that hiring and sep-
arations rates are of a similar order of magnitude in the ASSD as in JOLTS. The fact that
labor turnover among Austrian firms is at least as high as in the US has been pointed out in
Stiglbauer et al. 2003. Similar to DFH, we find that vacancy rates and vacancy yields vary
substantially across industries (see Table A4 in the Appendix). While we find remarkably
similar vacancy patterns, AMS vacancy patterns differ from JOLTS with respect to employer
size: DFH report that vacancy rates increase (and vacancy yields decrease) with employer
size, the opposite is true in the Austrian data. The most likely reason is that larger firms are
more likely to post their vacancies on platforms other than the AMS.
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Notes: Each data point corresponds to the average within a given wage percentile of the sample. The sample
is trimmed for wage values below the first and above the 99th percentile.
6 Vacancy Durations and Entry Wages
A central assumption in many search-theoretic models of the labor market is that firms post
wages or commit to a wage offer, and that the promised wage affects the likelihood of filling
a job opening. This is true both in models of directed search such as Moen (1997), where a
higher posted wage increases the number of workers applying to the job, or in models of
random search such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), where a higher posted wage increases
the likelihood for a given worker to accept the job offer.
Evidence on the relationship between vacancy filling and entry wages is scarce, with
the exception of Faberman and Menzio (2018) who use data from the Earnings and Op-
portunities Pilot Project (EOPP) in the U.S. for the years 1980 and 1982. In stark contrast
with the above canonical search models, they document a positive relationship between va-
cancy durations and entry wages, even after controlling for firm- and worker characteristics.
Faberman and Menzio interpret their evidence cautiously, arguing that is not necessarily
in contradiction with search theory because their controls may be insufficient to account
for all the relevant heterogeneity that bears on the relationship between starting wages and
vacancy duration.
With the matched vacancy-employer-employee data we can go one step further. Since
we can link the posted vacancy to the earnings history of the worker filling the vacancy, we
can look in more detail on the relationship between the vacancy durations and entry wages
of eventually filled vacancies.
23
We start our empirical analysis in Figure 7 by plotting the raw averages of log vacancy
durations for each percentile bin of the distribution of entry wages. As evident from the
figure, the relationship between entry wages and vacancy duration appears to be non-
linear. There is a negative slope in the lowest percentiles of the entry-wage distribution,
but a strongly positive relationship at medium and high percentiles of the entry wage
distribution. While the linear regression line clearly does not provide a good fit to the
data, it is drawn for comparison purposes with the paper of Faberman and Menzio (2018)
whose sample of around 1,500 job openings was too small to assess non-linearities in the
relationship between entry wages and vacancy duration.
Table 4 further analyzes the relationship between vacancy durations and entry wages.
Column 1 documents an overall positive relationship between vacancy durations and entry
wages when controlling for time fixed effects. In Column 2 we include indicators for
early posting (dummies for 0-7 days, 8-30 days, 31-60 days, and more than 60 days). The
inclusion of early-posting dummies addresses the concern that firms trying to fill their
vacancies quickly may be posting early. The results show that this concern is not of first-
order relevance. Posting ahead of time of the date of job availability does not seem to
confound the duration/entry-wage relationship. In Column 3 we include further control
variables for the required education level of the job, and the gender, age, age squared and
the year of labor market entry of the person matched to the job. The conditional correlation
becomes much smaller in magnitude and is no longer significant, suggesting that observed
characteristics are important correlates for vacancy durations.
Column 4 is our preferred specification. In this column, we additionally control for
region-, industry- and 6-digit-occupation-fixed effects. The conditional correlation suggests
an elasticity of vacancy durations with respect to the entry wage of -0.035. Note that the
negative sign is in line with the qualitative prediction of wage-posting models. The fact that
the sign on the wage changes when including a fine grid of industry and occupation dum-
mies (i.e. when moving from Column 1 to Column 4 in Table 4) suggests that heterogeneity
at the worker- and match level is an important confounder of the relationship between
vacancy durations and entry wages. These results also echo the results in Marinescu and
Wolthoff (2016), who find that the relationship between applications and posted wages has
the expected (positive) sign only when including job title fixed effects in the regression.22
Overall, however, the relation remains economically small, with a 1% increase in the entry
wage being associated with a 0.03% decrease in the duration of a vacancy.
In Column 5, we show that the relation is robust to the inclusion of further worker- and
firm covariates, which are available only for a subsample of firms in our sample. It turns out
22To be precise, in their results the sign only changes when they include job title fixed effects but not when
they just include 6-digit SOC codes.
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that vacancies with longer durations are associated with longer subsequent job durations
though not with higher wage growth on the filled job. Moreover, including these variables
in the regression does not alter significantly the coefficient of the entry wage. This alleviates
concerns that the coefficient of the entry wage is biased due to a possible negative correlation
with wage growth on the job. This latter robustness check is important, because theories of
posted wages ultimately apply to wages over the entire duration of the job and not just the
entry wage. We also find that younger firms are filling vacancies more quickly, but there
is no clear relation between firm size and vacancy durations. The final Column 6 shows
results for a subsample of workers with at least two unemployment spells. This allows to
include individual fixed effects in the regression model to control for any time-invariant
observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity. The regression coefficient on the entry
wage is remarkably similar to the one in Column 4. Based on the evidence of Table 1 we
conclude that there exists a robust, negative, and significant association between vacancy
durations and entry wages, but the economic significance of the relationship is small.
As discussed in section 4.2 above, the richness to the vacancy leads to alternative def-
initions of a vacancy. The measurement concept underlying the results of Table 4 is AMS
duration. Results in Appendix Tables A5 and A6 show that the relationship between vacancy
durations and entry wages relationship is robust and very similar results emerge when we
measure the dependent variable as JOLTS duration or Posting duration.23
As demonstrated by the results in Table 4, worker- and job-specific heterogeneity as
captured by occupation dummies and individual worker fixed-effects are an important
confounder of the relationship between vacancy durations and entry wages. Since our
vacancy-employer-employee data let us observe the earnings histories of those workers
who are matched to a given vacancy for many years before and after the match, we can go
one step further. We decompose the starting wage into worker- and firm effects using the
framework of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (AKM) and then relate each component
of the wage to vacancy durations. More precisely, we build a yearly panel of daily wages
(always looking at the job held on June 30) of the universe of workers and firms observed
in the Austrian matched employer-employee data (ASSD) and estimate the model
logwit = θi + ψJ(i,t) + x′itρ + d + εi jt, (1)
23In addition, Table A7 in the Appendix shows that the results are not affected when we use weights that
adjust for selection of our baseline sample relative to the full sample of vacancies posted at the AMS based
on educational requirements of the job, industry and region for each year in the sample period (see the table
notes for futher details). Furthermore, Table A8 shows that the results are robust to (1) trimming the sample
below the 1st and above 99th percentile of the distribution of starting wages, (2) trimming the sample below
the 5th and above 95th percentile of the distribution of starting wages, (3) restricting the sample to men or (4)
to ages 25-54.
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Table 4: Linear Regressions with Log Vacancy Duration as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.157 0.157 0.017 -0.034 -0.029 -0.041
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012) (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.019)**
On-job wage growth -0.023
(0.033)
Log job duration 0.023
(0.002)***
Lagged firm growth -0.054
(0.007)***
Firm age -0.002
(0.000)***
Log firm size 0.009
(0.005)*
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 290822 290822 281097 281097 176158 126854
R2 0.011 0.012 0.043 0.112 0.120 0.568
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level, except for column 5 where clustered standard errors did not converge due to the presence
of many dummy variables. Early posting fixed effects are dummies for posting the vacancy 0-7 days, 8-30 days,
31-60 days, and more than 60 days prior to the desired start date. Controls include gender, age, age squared,
and dummies for the minimum educational requirement of the job as well as year of labor market entry.
where wit denotes the wage of worker i in year t, θi identifies the worker effect, ψJ(i,t)
identifies the firm effect (where J(i, t) denotes the firm where i is employed in year t). We
also control for observable time-varying worker characteristics xit (specifically, we control
for a fourth-order polynomial in experience and firm tenure), year dummies dt and εi jt
denotes the residual. Since the model is computationally very demanding, we use the years
1985 to 2014 of the ASSD data to estimate (1).24 We then relate the components of the entry
24The basic assumption of the AKM framework is additive separability between firm and worker effects.
To assess how well this describes the data, we computed the average residual εi jt according to the decile
of the firm and worker effect, as proposed by Card, Heining and Kline (2013). Generally, deviations from
additive separability appear to be mild (the absolute value always stays below 0.015) and concentrated among
establishments paying high wages. See Figure A11 in the Appendix for details.
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Figure 8: AKM Worker Effects and Log Vacancy Duration
Notes: The figures show partial correlations of AKM worker effects and log vacancy duration, i.e. controlling
for the AKM establishment effects, the AKM residuals and the AKM person experience effect (left) resp. the
AKM person experience effect (right). Each data point corresponds to the average within a given percentile
of the AKM worker effect in the sample. The sample is trimmed for wage values below the first and above
the 99th percentile.
wage to vacancy duration by estimating
log di jk = β0 + ψˆ jβψ + θˆiβθ + x′itρˆβρ + εˆi jkβε + z
′
i jkγ + ηi jk, (2)
where di jk denotes the vacancy duration of vacancy k posted by firm j and eventually
matched to worker i. ψˆ j, θˆi, x′itρˆ and εˆi jk denote the estimated coefficients from equation (1)
and zi jk is a vector of additional characteristics of the firm-worker pair. Note that x′itρˆ is a
pure worker experience effect as tenure is zero by definition for entry wages.
Figures 8-10 present partial correlation graphs of vacancy durations and the various
wage components. The points in the graph correspond to the percentile bins of the distri-
bution of wage components, which are drawn against the average (log) vacancy durations
associated with the respective bin. Figure 8 draws the vacancy durations, respectively,
against the AKM person (pre-experience) effect (left panel), and the AKM experience effect
(right panel). Both graphs reveal a clear positive relationship suggesting that both dimen-
sion of worker heterogeneity are strongly associated with longer vacancy durations which,
in terms of magnitude, seem equally relevant. Figure 9 plots vacancy durations against the
AKM establishment effect and reveals a clear negative relationship. Taken together, Figures
8 and 9 reveal a clear picture: Vacancies posted by high-wage firms last shorter, vacancies
filled by high-wage workers last longer. In Figure 10, we plot the percentile bins of the
residual wage distribution against vacancy durations. The conditional correlation is less
clear. This is reassuring as we would have expected that there are many unobserved wage
determinants (not attributable to permanent worker- or establishment-differences) corre-
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Figure 9: AKM Establishment Effect and Log Vacancy Duration
Notes: The figure shows partial correlations of AKM establishment effects and log vacancy duration, i.e.
controlling for AKM worker effects and the AKM residual. Each data point corresponds to the average
within a given percentile of the AKM establishment effects in the sample. The sample is trimmed for wage
values below the first and above the 99th percentile.
lating with vacancy durations in both directions, thus yielding a less clear-cut association.
In addition, the AKM person and AKM establishment effects are measured with error and
thus these person- and firm-level measurement errors also go into the residual.
We proceed by presenting regression results that include the components of the AKM
decomposition (2) instead of the log entry wage as regressors (Table 5). The interesting
benchmark for comparison is the naive regression of log vacancy duration on the starting
wage in Column 1 of Table 4. Column 2 shows the results corresponding to the figures 8-10.
In particular, the regression reveals the most notable result visible from Figure 9: high-wage
firms manage to fill their vacancies more quickly.25 The elasticity of the vacancy duration
with respect to the firm (log-)wage component is -0.172 and highly statistically significant.
Size and significance of this effect turn out very robust and do not change when we add
control variables (Column 3), region-, industry- and occupation-fixed effects (Column 4),
when we look at the subsample where controls for the subsequently formed match and
other firm-level controls can be observed (Column 5), and when we confine the sample by
workers who are repeatedly observed filling a vacancy so that individual fixed effects can
25Note that the coefficients on the AKM effects in Column 2 do not have to add up to the coefficient on the
entry wage in column 1. E.g., consider the case where the variance of one of the components is tiny but its
effect on vacancy duration is large, then the regression coefficient on the log entry wage in column 1 will do
little to reflect the effect of the component with the small variance, whereas the regression in column 2 will
because it breaks out all components of the entry wage.
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Figure 10: AKM Residual and Log Vacancy Duration
Notes: The figure shows partial correlations of AKM residuals and log vacancy duration, i.e. controlling for
AKM worker and establishment effects. Each data point corresponds to the average within a given percentile
of the AKM residual in the sample. The sample is trimmed for wage values below the first and above the
99th percentile.
be included instead of the worker’s AKM wage component (Column 6).26 Qualitatively,
this result appears consistent with a model in which some firms post higher wages to
attract more workers and fill vacancies more quickly. In the next section, we confirm this
conjecture evaluating a dynamic model of wage posting and directed search. We also
confront the model’s quantitative predictions with the results in Table 5. As discussed in
detail in the next section, the estimated effect in our data is at least one order of magnitude
smaller than the prediction of our wage-posting model.
Table 5 also reports the estimates of the remaining wage components on vacancy dura-
tions. Both the AKM worker and the AKM experience components are positively associated
with vacancy durations. This suggests that, in the raw data, worker heterogeneity is the
dominant force behind the overall positive relationship of vacancy durations and entry
wages. If we interpret these AKM worker effects as proxy for innate and accumulated
human capital, these patterns may be either the result of longer decision lags in the hiring
process of high-skilled workers or due to more competition among firms the high-skill
segments of the labor market (i.e., a tighter labor market). The fact that unemployment du-
rations tend to be shorter for higher-skilled workers lends support for the latter view, though
it does not preclude the presence of both mechanisms. Introducing controls in Column 2
26We do not control for region-, industry- and occupation-fixed effects in this specification due to possible
multicollinearity introduced by the presence of a large set of dummy variables.
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reduces the size of both the estimated coefficients by up to 50%, but a robust, significantly
positive association remains. The size of the coefficients further decline when we introduce
6-digit occupation dummies (Column 4), suggesting that occupation dummies and AKM
worker effects are substitutes.27 All regressions in Columns 2-6 include the AKM resid-
ual that captures unobserved earnings-determinants not attributable to permanent worker-
or firm-differences. The correlation of these factors with vacancy durations is positive in
Columns 2 and 3, but turns negative once 6-digit occupation effects are included, which
mirrors the results in Table 4. The main takeaway of Table 5 is quite clear: vacancies that are
eventually filled by high-wage workers last longer; vacancies that are posted by high-wage
firms last shorter.
The results in Table 5 are based on the AMS duration concept. In Table 6, we repeat the
analysis above for the two alternative definitions of vacancy duration. Column 1 repeats
the results from our preferred specification (Column 4 in Table 5). In Columns 2 and 3,
we use as a dependent variable the duration of a vacancy according as measured by the
JOLTS duration and Posting duration concepts, respectively. Using these alternative vacancy
duration measures does not change the results of Table 5. While the estimated correlations
are somewhat smaller, the overall picture remains: shorter durations of vacancies posted by
high-wage firms; longer durations of vacancies filled by high-wage workers.28 The fact that
the elasticities are somewhat smaller is mainly due to the fact that the average duration for
these alternative measure is somewhat longer. Furthermore, the Table 6 shows results for
alternative specifications, where in Column 4 we use AMS duration as a dependent variable
and in Column 5 we use a dummy variable for whether AMS duration was positive (times
100). Both of these specifications confirm a strongly negative relationship between vacancy
durations and the AKM establishment effect. The results on the AKM worker effect are not
as robust, though this specification controls for a lot of worker-level controls. In separate
results not shown here, the AKM worker effect was strongly positively associated with
vacancy duration when not using the controls shown in the table here.
In the Appendix Table A13, we provide further evidence on the relationship between
vacancy durations and entry wages. A potential concern is that assumptions underlying
the AKM decomposition are too restrictive. For instance, they could be biased due to
endogenous mobility. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) argue that the estimated person effects
might be driven by the sequential sampling of alternative (high) wages leading to persistent
differences between otherwise identical individuals. We address this concern by looking
27Column 4 also adds industry and region fixed effects, but in results available on request we confirmed
that the drop in the coefficients is mainly due to the inclusion of the occupation dummies.
28In the Appendix, we provide the full set of results using the the time-since-posting measure (Table A10)
and the JOLTS vacancy concept (Table A9) .
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Table 6: Results for Alternative Specifications and Vacancy Concepts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline JOLTS Posting Linear Extensive
AKM establishment effect -0.209 -0.112 -0.118 -4.376 -4.444
(0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.837)*** (0.758)***
AKM worker fixed effect 0.063 0.062 0.059 0.146 -2.629
(0.015)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.384) (0.466)***
AKM worker exp. effect 0.046 0.038 0.031 -0.214 -1.896
(0.015)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.408) (0.478)***
AKM residual -0.030 -0.016 -0.015 -0.866 -1.031
(0.008)*** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.233)*** (0.257)***
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE (6 digits) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 271198 326842 330781 406351 406351
R2 0.113 0.210 0.333 0.101 0.126
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are
clustered at the establishment level. The results in Column (1) are the same as the results in Column
4 of Table 5, whereas the other columns report results with different dependent variables: Column (2)
uses the log of JOLTS duration; Column (3) uses the log of duration since posting as dependent variable;
Column (4) uses vacancy duration, measured in days, in linear form as dependent variable instead of
log vacancy duration; Column (5) uses a dummy for whether the vacancy duration was positive times
100 as dependent variable. See footnote of Table 5 for further details regarding the control variables.
only at job changes associated with an intermediate spell of unemployment. Intermediate
unemployment spells break the link of sequential sampling, as a wage offered to a currently
unemployed worker will only depend on worker and firm type and not on the employment
history. Nevertheless, estimating our preferred specification on this sample in Column 4 of
Table 5 reveals that the conclusions are unchanged.29
An alternative robustness check in Table A13 is based on the subsample of observations
where we can rely on at least 10 observations per worker and 10 observations per firm in
the earnings regression retrieving AKM worker and AKM establishment effects. This yields
slightly stronger association on AKM worker fixed- and experience-effects, but almost no
change in the association of vacancy durations and AKM establishment effects. Excluding
outliers (trimming at 1/99 or 5/95 percentiles of the entry wage distribution) yields very
29Re-estimating the worker and firm effects restricting our panel to job changes interrupted by registered
unemployment spells implies that, for every firm and worker, we lose a large number of observations leading
to less precise estimates. In addition, we cannot identify either the firm or worker effect for some vacancies.
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similar results, except that the effect of the AKM residual is somewhat stronger (more
negative). Furthermore, we restrict the sample to men or to prime-age workers (aged 25-
54). The idea is to check whether the results in a sample with strongly attached workers look
different from the results in the baseline sample. These robustness checks yield estimates
of the association between vacancy durations and AKM wage components that are in line
with the above patterns, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Finally, we reports results
where we split the sample by establishment size. We find that the coefficient on the AKM
establishment coefficient is very similar for both small and large establishments. This is
reassuring given that large establishments are somewhat under-represented in our sample,
and it suggests that our main results would not change if we had more large establishments
in our sample.30 Overall, our robustness checks confirm that the estimates presented in
Table 5 are stable.
We conclude that our vacancy-employer-employee data reveal a clear-cut and robust
relationship between vacancy durations and entry wages: vacancies posted by high-wage
firms last shorter; vacancies filled by high-wage workers last longer; and there is a small
negative relationship with the AKM wage residual conditional on occupation effects. These
results points to the importance of both firm- and worker-heterogeneity to explain observed
vacancy durations. In the next section we set up a theoretical framework that, in our view,
is a natural starting point to rationalize the above findings.
7 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we evaluate our evidence through the lens of directed search theory. The
model of Kaas and Kircher (2015) is a natural starting point, as it characterizes directed
search in the context of firm heterogeneity in productivity and was calibrated explicitly to
match the facts documented in DFH (2013). In the Kaas and Kircher model, posted wages
act as a recruitment device: firms that want to grow fast post higher wages to reduce the
time it takes to fill a vacancy. As demonstrated in Kaas and Kircher (2015), the model has
important implications for the evolution aggregate matching efficiency over the business
cycle.31
30Furthermore, results do not change much in weighted regression (Table A11), with weights that adjust for
selection of our baseline sample relative to the full sample of vacancies posted at the AMS based on educational
requirements of the job, industry, region for each year in the sample period (see the table notes for futher
details).
31In principle, one could also consider a version of the model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), but we are
not aware of any version of this model that was set up and calibrated towards the facts in DFH. In addition,
the Burdett and Mortensen model generates a negative relationship of vacancy durations and wages only
due to the presence of on-the-job search, where employed workers on different rungs of the job ladder have
33
The goal of the exercise here is to re-calibrate the model to match the features of the Aus-
trian labor market, including the DFH-type evidence documented in section 5. We then use
the model to evaluate whether the model can match three key observations of the previous
section: (1) the positive association of vacancy durations with raw (unconditional) starting
wages, (2) the positive association of vacancy durations with AKM worker effects, and most
importantly, (3) the negative association of vacancy durations with AKM establishment
effects.
7.1 Kaas and Kircher (2015) with Ex-Ante Worker Heterogeneity
We extend the model of Kaas and Kircher to the case of ex-ante worker heterogeneity.32 We
follow Kaas and Kircher as closely as possible and concentrate here on the features that are
specific to the model with ex-ante worker heterogeneity.
In the model, there is a continuum of firms, which produce F(y, x,L1,L2, ...,LN, y, x) units
of output with L1 ≥ 0, L2 ≥ 0, ..., LN ≥ 0 labor inputs. x is fixed firm-level productivity
and y is a firm-level productivity shock. New firms pay a setup cost K, draw a fixed firm
type x with probability pi(x) and die at exogenous rate δ0(x), which potentially differs across
firm types.33 Firms are hit with a firm-level productivity shock y with probability piy and
which is drawn uniformly at random from the interval [1 − y¯, 1 + y¯]. Firms search for
new employees by posting Vi vacancies for workers of type i, paying a fixed wage wi, and
paying recruitment costs C(V1,V2, ...,VN,L1,L2, ...,LN, y, x). The posted wage determines the
number of workers applying to the opening, λi, and thus determines the vacancy filling
rate mi. There are N different types of workers and there is a continuum of workers for each
worker type. Workers direct their search to a particular firm-vacancy sub-market j and quit
their job at exogenous rate s0, which we assume to be the same across worker types. The
quit rate is the lower bound on the total separation rate si ∈ [s0, 1] for a given worker type, as
firms hit by negative productivity shocks may decide to layoff some or all of their workers
of a given type. In equilibrium, workers are indifferent between the different sub-markets.
Workers supply a unit of labor when employed, and receive bi when unemployed. There is
no on-the-job search.
As Kaas and Kircher, we solve in our numerical simulations the social planner version of
the problem with flat-wage contracts.34 In equilibrium, wages vary both across worker and
different acceptance probabilities of outside offers, whereas in our data we only observe the matching process
of unemployed workers.
32The model of Kaas and Kircher also features aggregate shocks, which we abstract from here.
33Kaas and Kircher assume this mainly to match the establishment dynamics in the data.
34See their paper and our model appendix for further details.
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firm types. Even though there is no bargaining, wages vary across worker types because
workers don’t search in submarkets that deliver less than the value of unemployment and
thus, the unemployment benefit bi is a critical determinant of the posted wage. Posted wages
also depend on fixed and transitory firm productivity, x and y, and the size of its labor force
for each type of worker, L1,L2, ...,LN. Newly-born firms tend to post more vacancies and at
higher wages because they want to grow quickly toward their optimal size. The relationship
between firm productivity and posted wages is less clear and depends on assumptions about
the shape of the vacancy posting cost function. All else equal, firms that face a higher cost
of posting a vacancy, post a higher wage in order to fill their vacancies more quickly.
7.2 Calibration
We start by parameterizing the model of Kaas and Kircher (i.e., without worker hetero-
geneity). We follow them as closely as possible, allowing for 5 different firm types x and 5
different shocks y on the interval [1− 0.312, 1 + 0.312], but re-calibrate certain parameters to
match certain features of the Austrian labor market and vacancy data (see Table B1 in the
Appendix for all the parameter values): First, we set the vacancy cost scale parameter c to
0.11 to match a weekly vacancy filling rate of 0.10. Second, we set the parameters k and r
of the matching function m(λ) = (1 + kλ−r)− 1r to target a weekly job finding rate of 0.033 and
an elasticity of job finding to labor market tightness of 0.72. Finally, we set the entry cost K
to 2.4. As discussed in the Appendix of Kaas and Kircher, this is a pure normalization since
all firms’ value functions are linearly homogeneous in the vector (x, b, c,K).
In the model extension with ex-ante heterogeneous workers, we assume the following
functional forms for the production function and vacancy posting costs35:
F(L, y, x) = yx
N∑
i=1
(
ai(x)Lαi
)
, (3)
C(V ,L, y, x) =
N∑
i=1
(
ci
1 + γ
(Vi
Li
)γ
Vi
)
, (4)
which are the same as in Kaas and Kircher (2015), except that we sum over N types of
workers and ai(x) denotes worker-type-specific productivity, which potentially interacts
with firm type x. Note that our assumption of additivity of worker types in production and
vacancy costs implies that there are no complementarities in production or vacancy posting
35See also Eeckhout and Kircher (2018) who provide an extension of the model of Kaas and Kircher (2015)
with more general production functions, but linear vacancy posting costs.
35
Table 7: Calibration of Key Parameters in Model with Ex-Ante Heterogeneous Workers
Model Extension w/
Worker Heterogeneity
Parameters Kaas & Kircher (1) (2)
Worker a1(x1)/a2(x1) 1/1 0.7/1.3 0.9/1.1
Productivities: a1(x2)/a2(x2) 1/1 0.7/1.3 0.8/1.2
a1(x3)/a2(x3) 1/1 0.7/1.3 0.7/1.3
a1(x4)/a2(x4) 1/1 0.7/1.3 0.6/1.4
a1(x5)/a2(x5) 1/1 0.7/1.3 0.5/1.5
Vacancy c1 0.11 0.07 0.10
Posting Costs: c2 0.11 0.08 0.08
between worker types, as the marginal product and the marginal vacancy posting cost for
each worker type i is independent of the number of other types of workers employed at the
same firm. In the model without worker heterogeneity, the firm productivity levels for each
type of firm are directly taken from Kaas and Kircher, but then scaled down by a factor of
0.815 in the case of the model with multiple worker types to target that the average firm
size in the economy remains unchanged.
In what follows, we present three calibrations: (i) the baseline model of Kaas and
Kircher without ex-ante worker heterogeneity, but calibrated to Austrian data, (ii) a model
with worker heterogeneity, where relative worker productivities are independent of firm
productivities, and (iii) a model with worker heterogeneity with complementarities be-
tween worker skills and firm productivities (generating positive assortative matching as
high-skilled workers are relatively more productive at high-productivity firms). Table 7
presents the assumed parameter values on worker productivities and vacancy posting costs
in the three calibrations. The two calibrations with ex-ante worker heterogeneity assume
(for simplicity) two types of workers and set relative worker productivities to match the dis-
persion of AKM worker fixed effects in the data with a standard deviation of 0.3. As shown
in Table 8 below, the correlation of worker and firm types in calibration (iii) (assortative
matching) is 0.51, which is in the range of estimates provided by Borovickova and Shimer
(2018) using Austrian data. All our calibrations with ex-ante worker heterogeneity assume
that type-2 workers are preferred by all firms and thus we refer to them as the high-skilled
type. There is nothing, however, that restricts us to do so; in principle, we could allow for
type-2 workers to be less productive than type-1 worker at low productivity firms, which
would generate even stronger positive assortative matching.
Note that we assume that bi = bE(ai(x)), where b = 0.1, i.e. the unemployment benefit is
proportional to average worker productivity across firms. We calibrate the model such that
36
the replacement rate (b over average wage) is 0.7, as in Kaas and Kircher. In the versions
with heterogeneous workers, we calibrate vacancy posting costs c to match a job-filling rate
of 0.11 for the worker of type 1 and 0.094 for the worker of type 2, to generate the positive
association of AKM-worker fixed effects and vacancy duration. This calibration strategy
generates vacancy posting costs that are nearly identical across worker types. In fact, if we
were to impose identical costs, the results would be very similar.36 The key point here is that
vacancy posting costs are less than proportional to worker-ability and thus, for workers of
type 1, firms post fewer vacancies but at a higher filling rate (by increasing posted wages).
7.3 Results
We start by reporting a few results of the model without ex-ante worker heterogeneity,
calibrated to Austrian data. Panel A in Table 8 shows selected model results in the model
where the vacancy cost elasticity , γ, varies between 1 and 0.1.37 As can be seen in the
Table, the elasticity of vacancy duration to the starting wage is negative and very large.
In other words, the posted wage appears to be a very strong instrument to affect vacancy
duration by affecting the length of the queue in a given labor market. The elasticity declines
substantially with the parameter γ but remains below -1. At the same time the model with
a low value of γ , is inconsistent with the DFH-type of evidence, which shows that the job
filling rate is strongly positively correlated with employment growth and hiring at the firm
level. This is also illustrated in Figure 11, which shows that a calibration with γ = 0.5 yields
a good fit to the relationship of the firm growth and the weekly vacancy filling rate.
Panels B and C of Table 8 show the results for the model with ex-ante heterogeneous
workers. The table includes the AKM regression coefficients, which were estimated on data
simulated from the model with 20,000 firms and 400,000 workers over a period of 10 years.38
The results show that now the relationship between the entry wage and vacancy duration is
positive, with a similar coefficient as in the data. Just like in our empirical results, however,
this masks the differential effects of the AKM worker and AKM firm effects on vacancy
duration: The coefficient on the AKM worker effect is positive and similar to the one in the
data. This is not surprising, given that we calibrated the vacancy cost scale parameter c to
generate a job filling rate of 0.11 for the low-skilled worker and 0.094 for the high-skilled
36See Engbom and Moser (2018) for a similar finding in the context of an extension of the model of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) to ex-ante worker heterogeneity.
37The Appendix Table B2 contains the results for various alternative calibrations, including the original
calibration in the paper of Kaas and Kircher (2015).
38To be precise, we estimated the model for 520 weeks and then used the data from the last week of each
year to estimate the AKM worker and firm fixed effects. In analogy to the empirical results, in a second step,
we then estimated the linear regressions of log vacancy duration on the starting wage and the AKM effects.
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Table 8: Simulation Results of Model of Kaas and Kircher and Model Extension with
Ex-Ante Worker Heterogeneity
Panel A. Kaas and Kircher
Data γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.1
Elast. of Vacancy Duration to Starting Wage 0.16 -21.8 -17.9 -3.9
Elast. of Hiring Rate to Job Filling Rate 0.18 0.27 0.14 0.03
Model Extension
w/ Worker Heterogeneity
Panel B. w/o PAM
Data γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.1
Correlation of Worker and Firm Types — 0.00 0.01 0.01
Elast. of Vacancy Duration to
... Starting Wage 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.26
... AKM Firm Fixed Effect -0.19 -9.9 -7.4 -1.9
... AKM Worker Fixed Effect 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26
... AKM Residual 0.01 -25.3 -24.7 -8.8
Elast. of Hiring Rate to Job Filling Rate 0.18 0.25 0.14 0.03
Model Extension
w/ Worker Heterogeneity
Panel C. w/ PAM
Data γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.1
Correlation of Worker and Firm Types — 0.51 0.51 0.48
Elast. of Vacancy Duration to
... Starting Wage 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.30
... AKM Firm Fixed Effect -0.19 -13.5 -7.0 -0.8
... AKM Worker Fixed Effect 0.25 0.09 0.22 0.29
... AKM Residual 0.01 -23.6 -25.0 -3.8
Elast. of Hiring Rate to Job Filling Rate 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.04
Notes: Panel A shows the results of the model without worker heterogeneity, i.e. the model of Kaas and
Kircher calibrated to the Austrian data. Panel B shows results for the the calibration (1) and Panel C shows
results for the the calibration (2) of the model with worker heterogeneity in Table 7. The model calibration in
Panel C features substantial Positive Assortative Matching (PAM), as can be seen in the correlation of worker
and firm types in the table. The statistics from the data refer to the coefficients reported in column 1 and 3
of Table 5. The statistics from the model are based on simulated data with 20,000 firms and 400,000 workers
over a period of 10 years.
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Figure 11: Weekly Job Filling Rates by Employment Growth in Data and Model
worker. Qualitatively, the model matches the sign of the coefficient on the AKM firm effect.
However, just like in the baseline model, the magnitude of the coefficient is more than an
order of magnitude higher than in the data. Similarly, the coefficient on the AKM residual of
the starting wage is very negative in the model but close to 0 in the data. The model version
with a lower value for the vacancy cost elasticity parameter γ lowers the elasticity of vacancy
duration to the AKM firm effect and the AKM residual, but at γ = 0.1 the model no longer
matches the elasticity of the hiring rate to the job filling rate and the relationship of the job
filling rate to the growth rate of the firm (see Figure B1 in the Appendix). The similarity of
the results in the model without and with complementarities between high-skilled workers
and high-x firms, suggests that our regressions results are not affected by the issues related
to AKM that impede the identification of assortative matching.
7.4 Discussion and Further Extensions
Overall, the results so far appear to suggest that firms are not using posted wages as an active
recruiting device, at least not in a manner that is quantitatively large enough to explain the
sharp increase in vacancy filling rate for growing firms. Rather, the results in DFH (2013)
and our replication of their results appear to be driven by other channels of recruiting effort,
as in the model of Gavazza, Mongey and Violante (2018). This conclusion, however, rests
on important assumptions.
First, our model simulations are based on a version of the model of Kaas and Kircher
with flat-wage contracts. Allowing for wage-tenure contracts may break the link between
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Table 9: Simulation Results of Model of Kaas and Kircher with Ex-Ante Worker Hetero-
geneity and Non-Wage Amenities
Elasticity of Vacancy Model w/o PAM Model w/ PAM
Duration to: Data σψ = 0 σψ = 0.1 σψ = 0.2 σψ = 0 σψ = 0.1 σψ = 0.2
Starting Wage 0.16 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.29 0.25 0.18
AKM Firm Effect -0.19 -7.4 -0.55 -0.09 -7.0 -0.61 -0.11
AKM Worker Effect 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.24
AKM Residual 0.01 -24.7 -0.07 0.00 -25.0 -0.06 0.00
Notes: All model simulations are based on model with γ = 0.5. The correlation of worker and firm types
and the elasticity of the hiring rate to the job filling rate are the same as in Panel B (for model without PAM)
and Panel C (for model with PAM) of Table 8. The statistics from the data refer to the coefficients reported in
column 1 and 3 of Table 5. The statistics from the model are based on simulated data with 20,000 firms and
400,000 workers over a period of 10 years.
starting wages and the value of a job if wage growth is inversely related to the starting
wage. It is important to note here, however, that our regressions results in the empirical
section are not affected when we control for wage growth on the job and the duration of the
job, suggesting that the restriction to flat-wage contracts in our model is reasonable, at least
in the present empirical application.
Second, there could be a potential endogeneity issue, in the sense that firms may post
higher wages for vacancies they expect to take longer to fill. This type of heterogeneity in
vacancy filling rates would lead the coefficient on the AKM firm effect and the AKM residual
to be biased towards zero or even a positive number. Yet, if this were the case, firms should
respond also on other margins. In particular, firms expecting long vacancy durations should
post further in advance of their desired start date. Our empirical results, however, are not
strongly affected once we control for the duration between dates of posting and desired job
start (which we observed in the data for each single vacancy). In other words, even when
we line up vacancies that were posted equally early (= equally long before the desired job
start date), the relationship between vacancy posting and starting wages remains similar.
Finally, measurement error in wages or the presence of non-wage amenities could bias
the coefficients on the firm effect and the residual toward zero. This is particularly relevant
as our model predicts a rather small dispersion in wages for a given worker type. While
measurement error is likely to be small in administrative data, non-wage amenities have a
potentially similar effect on the estimated relationship between entry wages and vacancy
duration. Moreover, recent work by Hall and Mueller (2018) and Sorkin (2018) suggests that
non-wage amenities exhibit a large dispersion across both jobs and firms and are crucial
to understand features of the data such as the job acceptance behavior of unemployed
workers or worker flows across firms. Introducing match-specific heterogeneity into the
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model leaves the model structure unchanged, but the wage now satisfies log(w) = log(wˆ)+ψ,
where w is the per-period value of the job, wˆ is the observed wage and ψ ∼ N(0, σ2ψ) is a
non-wage amenity, which can be interpreted as fixed attributes of the job or the firm (or
the job seeker’s valuation thereof) that the employer cannot influence when posting the
vacancy. We assume that both w and ψ are constant over the duration of the job. Our model
gives the total value of the job w and together with the draw of the non-wage amenity ψ,
we get a value for the observed wage wˆ. Hall and Mueller estimate the standard deviation
of non-wage values of jobs to be 0.35, but we adopt here a somewhat more conservative
approach and consider values of 0.1 and 0.2. Table 9 shows the results of the simulations of
the model with non-wage amenities. It turns out that the bias in the estimated elasticity of
both the AKM firm effect and the AKM residual is large, even for the case with σψ = 0.1. The
reason is that the dispersion of wages for a given worker type in the model is quite small
and thus even a small degree of dispersion in non-wage amenities attenuates the estimated
relationship strongly.39 Interestingly, the elasticity of vacancy duration with respect to the
AKM residual is close to zero, whereas the elasticity of vacancy duration to the AKM firm
effect remains negative and close to the one in the data. The reason is that the AKM firm
effects average out some of the match-specific noise introduced by the non-wage amenities.
In summary, these results provide a potential resolution of matching both our DFH-type
evidence as well as our evidence on vacancy durations and entry wages in the context of a
model of directed search. The results also point to the challenges in recovering a negative
relationship between vacancy durations and entry wages in the data and provide additional
support for our approach of relating vacancy duration not only to the entry wage but also
to its firm-level component.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how vacancy durations are related to entry wages of workers filling
a position. We exploit data from a new linked data set combining information on (durations
and characteristics of) individual vacancies and matched employer-employee data. The
resulting vacancy-employer-employee dataset allows us to link vacancy information to the
employment dynamics (growth, hirings, separations) of the posting firm as well as to the
wages of the workers eventually filling a vacancy. Exploiting the link of the vacancy to the
worker allows us to study the association between vacancy durations and entry wages. We
find that starting wages and vacancy durations are positively correlated in raw data, but
39The reason is that unemployed workers are very willing to trade off a higher wage with a longer unem-
ployment spell and thus, firms only need to post a slightly higher wage to shorten their vacancy spell.
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the correlation turns negative when controlling sufficiently for worker-level heterogeneity.
Moreover, we find that the negative association is particularly strong with the establishment
component of the starting wage. The link of the vacancy to the firm allows us to replicate
in the Austrian data the results of Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2013) that growing
firms fill their vacancies faster.
To understand the relationship between firm growth, vacancy filling and posted wages,
we extend the model of Kaas and Kircher (2015) to allow for ex-ante heterogeneous work-
ers. While the model qualitatively captures our empirical findings, there is a strong tension
between matching the sharp increase in vacancy filling for growing firms and the response
of vacancy filling to firm-level wages. The implication of this finding is clear: the mea-
sured elasticity between establishment-level wages and vacancy durations is an order of
magnitude too small to account for substantial variations of matching efficiency across es-
tablishments, and thus the evidence points to other mechanisms as the main drivers of
aggregate recruiting intensity over the business cycle, as e.g. in the model of Gavazza,
Mongey and Violante (2018). We remain cautious, however, in our assessment and believe
that the wage posting mechanism may still play a role in explaining some of the variation
in recruiting intensity, as a moderate degree of dispersion in non-monetary job amenities
considerably alleviates the aforementioned tension in the model of Kaas and Kircher.
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Online Appendix
A Summary Statistics and Additional Figures and Tables
A.1 Descriptive Statistics and Figures
Table A1: Size and Structure of the AMS Vacancy Database, 1997-2014
(AMS Universe)
Vacancies Establishments
N % N
A. Vacancies by Exit Status
Total 5,354,139 100 269,157
Filled 4,625,795 86 256,503
by AMS 1,249,553 27 164,139
by Others 3,376,242 73 231,404
Lapsed Vacancies 728,344 14 111,705
B. Multiple Vacancies
Total 5,389,723 100 269,027
Single Vacancies 1,432,928 27 247,585
Multiple Vacancies 3,956,795 73 140,396
Identical 2,188,548 55 93,981
Not Identical 1,768,247 45 110,050
Notes: Number of vacancies and number of distinct establishments for the universe
of AMS vacancies. Panel A is based on vacancies with an outflow in our sample
period 1997m9–2014m2 excluding right-censored spells, i.e. vacancies still in progress
in 2014m2. Panel B is based on vacancies with an inflow in our sample period 1997m9–
2014m2 excluding left-censored spells, i.e. vacancies that are already in progress in
1997m9. Hence, the difference between the total of outflows in Panel A and the total
of inflows in Panel B is the number of censored spells.
One common issue with job board data is that firms post one vacancy but intend to hire
multiple workers for that position. Survey data such as the JOLTS have an advantage in this
respect, as they collect information on the number of open positions and do not rely on the
number of postings. Luckily, the AMS asks firms about the number of open positions and
records multiple and possibly identical vacancies as separate entries in the data. It makes
this effort because it would like to know many unemployed workers can be matched to
the firm. Figure A1 shows (employment-weighted) distribution of the number of vacancies
by firm in a typical month, weighted by the employment share of each firm. About 50%
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Figure A1: The Distribution of Number of Vacancies, by Firm and Month (Employment
Weighted)
of employment is in establishments posting exactly one vacancy, 18% post two vacancies
and the remainder of firms posts three or more vacancies.40 We also find that many of the
multiple vacancies are indeed identical: among firms that post at least two vacancies in a
given month, 55% of vacancies have a twin-sister vacancy, meaning that all characteristics
of the vacancy are identical (but not the vacancy outcomes such as vacancy duration). As
can be seen in Figure A1, the share of identical vacancies is particularly high among firms
that post 10 vacancies or more in a given month.
40We also find that 77% of firms in our firm sample do not have any vacancy open in a typical month.
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Figure A2: Vacancy Filling Hazard and Vacancy Lapse Hazard, Relative to the Date of
Availability of the Job
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
1997q1 2001q1 2005q1 2009q1 2013q1
dateq
Exact Proxied
(a) Posting duration
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
1997q1 2001q1 2005q1 2009q1 2013q1
dateq
Exact Proxied
(b) JOLTS duration
Figure A3: Comparison of Duration Measures Based on Exact (Daily) or Proxied (Monthly)
Posting Date
49
A.2 Vacancy Filling over the Business Cycle
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Figure A4: The Vacancy Filling Hazard, the Stock of Vacancies, the Unemployment Rate
and Labor Market Tightness over Time
Notes: Labor Market Tightness is defined as the ratio of the stock of vacancies in the AMS data and the
number of unemployed from labor force survey data (Source: OECD). Labor Market Tightness is normalized
to 1 at the beginning of the sample period. The elasticity of the job filling hazard to labor market tightness is
-0.47.
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Figure A5: The Vacancy Filling Hazard, the Stock of Vacancies, the Unemployment Rate
and Labor Market Tightness over Time (Immediately Available Vacancies Only)
Notes: Labor Market Tightness is defined as the ratio of the stock of vacancies in the AMS data and the
number of unemployed from labor force survey data (Source: OECD). Labor Market Tightness is normalized
to 1 at the beginning of the sample period. The elasticity of the job filling hazard to labor market tightness is
-0.37.
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Figure A6: The Vacancy Lapse Hazard, the Stock of Vacancies, the Unemployment Rate and
Labor Market Tightness over Time
Notes: Labor Market Tightness is defined as the ratio of the stock of vacancies in the AMS data and the
number of unemployed from labor force survey data (Source: OECD). Labor Market Tightness is normalized
to 1 at the beginning of the sample period. The elasticity of the lapse hazard to labor market tightness is 0.03.
52
A.3 Vacancy Filling and Firm Growth
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Figure A7: Establishment Growth and Vacancy Yields, for All Vacancies (Left) and Imme-
diately Available Vacancies (Right)
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Figure A8: Establishment Growth and Vacancy Filling, for All Vacancies (Top) and Imme-
diately Available Vacancies (Bottom)
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Figure A9: Establishment Growth and Vacancy Lapses, for All Vacancies (Left) and Imme-
diately Available Vacancies (Right)
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Figure A10: Job Filling Rates and Gross Hires Rates by Growth Rate Bin, for All Vacancies
(Left) and Immediately Available Vacancies (Right)
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Table A2: Employment Shares - ASSD Universe versus Matched Samples
Employment Share
ASSD
Universe
Firm
Sample
Worker
Sample
Austrian Sample 100.0 100.0 100.0
Major industry
Manufacturing, mining, and quarrying 21.1 28.2 29.7
Construction 8.6 14.3 14.4
Wholesale and retail trade 18.6 21.1 21.3
Tourism, hotels, and restaurants 5.8 10.0 10.2
Transportation, information, and communication 7.2 6.3 6.2
Finance and insurance 4.3 2.9 2.6
Education, health, and social services 7.9 3.8 3.3
Other services 26.4 13.1 12.0
Establishment size classes
0-9 employees 19.2 18.5 14.7
10-49 employees 22.7 33.8 33.1
50-249 employees 23.6 29.4 31.7
250-999 employees 17.9 15.5 17.1
1’000+ employees 16.6 2.9 3.3
Worker turnover category
No Turnover 23.4 25.5 21.9
First Quintile 15.4 14.7 15.5
Second Quintile 15.3 14.8 15.5
Third Quintile 15.4 15.1 15.5
Fourth Quintile 15.7 15.0 16.5
Fifth Quintile 14.9 14.9 15.0
Establishment Wage Fixed Effects Quartiles
First Quartile 5.7 8.4 9.0
Second Quartile 13.5 18.9 19.3
Third Quartile 32.4 27.9 27.3
Fourth Quartile 48.4 44.9 44.4
Notes: Employment shares based on ASSD employment for the three subsamples.
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Table A3: Monthly Hires and Separation Rates - ASSD Universe versus Matched Samples
Hires Rate Separation Rate
ASSD Firm Worker ASSD Firm Worker
Austrian Sample 4.4 4.6 4.7 3.8 4.0 4.1
Major industry
Manufacturing, mining, and quarrying 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4
Construction 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.5 5.6
Wholesale and retail trade 3.8 3.2 3.2 3.4 2.8 2.8
Tourism, hotels, and restaurants 10.1 10.7 10.9 8.1 9.0 9.3
Transportation, information, and communication 4.4 4.8 4.8 3.7 4.2 4.2
Finance and insurance 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.9
Education, health, and social services 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.5 3.8 3.9
Other services 4.8 6.4 6.7 4.0 5.7 6.1
Establishment size classes
0-9 employees 6.1 6.3 6.8 5.5 6.6 7.5
10-49 employees 5.0 5.1 5.3 4.0 4.0 4.1
50-249 employees 3.9 4.0 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.4
250-999 employees 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.8 2.7
1’000+ employees 3.5 2.8 2.7 3.1 2.4 2.4
Worker turnover category
No Turnover 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
First Quintile 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Second Quintile 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.8
Third Quintile 2.6 3.1 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.9
Fourth Quintile 4.7 5.6 5.5 4.3 5.0 5.0
Fifth Quintile 19.3 19.4 19.1 15.6 16.2 16.1
Establishment Wage Fixed Effects Quartiles
First Quartile 7.6 4.8 4.7 5.7 4.1 4.1
Second Quartile 5.2 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.1 4.2
Third Quartile 4.3 5.0 5.1 3.9 4.3 4.5
Fourth Quartile 3.6 4.4 4.5 3.1 3.8 3.9
Notes: Hires and separation rates based on ASSD data for the three subsamples.
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Table A4: Vacancy Rates and Vacancy Yields by Industry, Size, Turnover, and Wage Fixed
Effect
Vacancy rate Vacancy yield
Immediately Immediately
All Available All Available
Austrian Sample 1.7 1.1 2.8 4.1
DFH (2013) 2.5 . 1.3 .
Major industry
Manufacturing, mining, and quarrying 0.9 0.7 2.8 3.9
Construction 1.5 1.1 3.5 4.8
Wholesale and retail trade 0.9 0.6 3.6 5.3
Tourism, hotels, and restaurants 4.8 2.3 2.5 4.6
Transportation, information, and communication 1.3 0.8 4.0 6.1
Finance and insurance 1.0 0.8 2.1 2.7
Education, health, and social services 1.0 0.6 4.3 7.9
Other services 3.7 2.9 2.0 2.5
Establishment size classes
0-9 employees 3.3 1.9 1.9 3.2
10-49 employees 1.8 1.2 3.0 4.2
50-249 employees 1.3 1.0 3.6 4.8
250-999 employees 0.8 0.6 4.8 6.6
1’000+ employees 0.7 0.4 8.7 14.8
Worker turnover category
No Turnover 1.6 1.0 0.0 0.0
First Quintile 0.5 0.3 2.1 3.1
Second Quintile 0.7 0.5 2.7 4.0
Third Quintile 1.0 0.7 3.3 4.7
Fourth Quintile 1.6 1.1 3.8 5.3
Fifth Quintile 5.2 3.5 4.2 6.1
Establishment Wage Fixed Effects Quartiles
First Quartile 1.6 1.1 2.9 4.1
Second Quartile 1.5 1.0 3.0 4.5
Third Quartile 1.8 1.2 2.8 4.3
Fourth Quartile 1.8 1.2 2.8 4.1
Notes: Vacancy rate and vacancy yield based on stock vacancies for the years 1997–2014 for the firm
subsample.
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A.4 Vacancy Durations and Entry Wages
Table A5: Linear Regressions with Log JOLTS Duration as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.113 0.117 0.025 -0.016 -0.013 -0.031
(0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)** (0.008)* (0.013)**
On-job wage growth -0.037
(0.027)
Log job duration 0.023
(0.002)***
Lagged firm growth -0.023
(0.005)***
Firm age -0.000
(0.000)
Log firm size 0.004
(0.004)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 354720 354720 338955 338955 213831 153640
R2 0.022 0.141 0.166 0.211 0.216 0.573
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. See footnote of Table 4 for further details.
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Table A6: Linear Regressions with Log Duration since Posting as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.110 0.116 0.023 -0.017 -0.013 -0.030
(0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)** (0.008) (0.013)**
On-job wage growth -0.039
(0.026)
Log job duration 0.028
(0.002)***
Lagged firm growth -0.019
(0.005)***
Firm age -0.000
(0.000)
Log firm size 0.001
(0.004)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 359321 359321 343051 343051 216606 155319
R2 0.017 0.273 0.294 0.335 0.343 0.633
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. See footnote of Table 4 for further details.
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Table A7: Weighted Regressions with Log Vacancy Duration as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.151 0.151 0.013 -0.027 -0.018 -0.050
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.014) (0.011)** (0.014) (0.020)**
On-job wage growth -0.082
(0.050)*
Log job duration 0.024
(0.003)***
Lagged firm growth -0.052
(0.009)***
Firm age -0.002
(0.001)***
Log firm size 0.006
(0.006)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 290822 290822 281097 281097 176158 126854
R2 0.014 0.015 0.046 0.131 0.141 0.604
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered
at the establishment level. See footnote of Table 4 for further details. Weights are constructed by running a
probit regression for each year in the AMS universe of a dummy for being in the worker sample on dummies
for educational requirement of job, region and industry and then taking the inverse of the predicted value of
the probit regression. Values above 1000 are windsorized (affecting 0.01 percent of observations in the worker
sample).
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Table A8: Additional Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log entry wage -0.034 -0.068 -0.065 -0.030 -0.028
(0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)***
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE (6 digits) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 281097 275484 253441 195100 184891
R2 0.112 0.112 0.111 0.121 0.120
Notes: Column (1) reports the baseline results from Column 4 in Table 4; Column (2) reports results
where the sample is trimmed below the 1st and above 99th percentile of the distribution of starting
wages; Column (3) reports results where the sample is trimmed below the 5th and above 95th percentile
of the distribution of starting wages; Column (4) reports results where the sample is restricted to men;
Column (5) reports results where the sample is restricted to ages 25-54.
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Table A9: Linear Regressions with Log JOLTS Duration as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.113
(0.010)***
AKM establishment effect -0.117 -0.104 -0.112 -0.138 -0.200
(0.025)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)***
AKM worker fixed effect 0.368 0.204 0.062 0.044
(0.015)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)***
AKM worker exp. effect 0.255 0.191 0.038 0.016 0.062
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.014) (0.060)
AKM residual 0.095 0.014 -0.016 -0.006 -0.011
(0.010)*** (0.008)* (0.007)** (0.008) (0.014)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Further Controls No No No No Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 354720 338831 326842 326842 207683 149904
R2 0.022 0.026 0.166 0.210 0.216 0.574
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. See footnote of Table 5 for further details.
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Table A10: Linear Regressions with Log Duration since Posting as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.110
(0.011)***
AKM establishment effect -0.137 -0.129 -0.118 -0.131 -0.202
(0.030)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)***
AKM worker fixed effect 0.366 0.216 0.059 0.041
(0.016)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)***
AKM worker exp. effect 0.242 0.190 0.031 0.006 0.047
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.014) (0.059)
AKM residual 0.102 0.016 -0.015 -0.005 -0.008
(0.012)*** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.008) (0.014)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Further Controls No No No No Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 359321 343154 330781 330781 210360 151545
R2 0.017 0.021 0.293 0.333 0.341 0.633
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. See footnote of Table 5 for further details.
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Table A11: Weighted Regressions with Log Vacancy Duration as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log entry wage 0.151
(0.015)***
AKM establishment effect -0.151 -0.204 -0.187 -0.223 -0.301
(0.050)*** (0.053)*** (0.036)*** (0.048)*** (0.044)***
AKM worker fixed effect 0.502 0.251 0.078 0.076
(0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)***
AKM worker exp. effect 0.373 0.270 0.062 0.059 0.152
(0.022)*** (0.029)*** (0.024)*** (0.030)** (0.093)
AKM residual 0.106 0.004 -0.025 -0.008 -0.024
(0.016)*** (0.015) (0.011)** (0.014) (0.021)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Posting FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes No
Further Controls No No No No Yes No
Occupation FE (6 digits) No No No Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 290822 278606 271198 271198 171426 123824
R2 0.014 0.021 0.050 0.132 0.142 0.606
Notes: Authors’ regressions with the worker sample for the years 1997-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. See footnote of Table 5 for further details. Weights are constructed by running a probit regression
for each year in the AMS universe of a dummy for being in the worker sample on dummies for educational requirement
of job, region and industry and then taking the inverse of the predicted value of the probit regression. Values above
1000 are windsorized (affecting 0.01 percent of observations in the worker sample).
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Figure A11: Mean Residuals by Person/Establishment Deciles
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B Model Appendix
B.1 Details on Model Extension with Ex-Ante Worker Heterogeneity
To gain some intuition, let’s consider first the model without any shocks and assume that
δ0(x) = δ0, i.e. the exogenous firm death rate does not depend on firm productivity. In
a model without shocks, firms never want to shrink and thus firm death and separations
are purely exogenous, i.e. δ(x) = δ0 and si = s0. Let Jx(L,W) be the value function of the
firm with productivity x, and Wi the wage bill to which the firm is committed for each type
of worker i. As in Kaas and Kircher, one can write Jx(L,W) = Jx(L, 0) −
∑N
i=1 Wi
1−β(1−δ0)(1−s0) where∑N
i=1 Wi
1−β(1−δ0)(1−s0) is the net present value of existing wage commitments, which is independent of
future hiring decisions. The firms recursive maximization problem can thus be written as
Jx(L, 0) = max
(m,V)
xF(L, x) − C(V ,L, x) −
N∑
i=1
Di(mi)Vi + β(1 − δ0)Jx(L+, 0),
s.t.L+i = Li(1 − s0) + miVi,∀i = 1, ...,N,
where Di(mi)Vi = wi(mi)
1−δ0
1−β(1−δ0)(1−s0)miVi is the net present value of wage commitments paid
for the miVi new hires of type i and wi(mi) is the wage for worker type i with job filling
rate mi. We refer to the text of Kaas and Kircher for the first order conditions and other
details, which follow in exact analogy for each worker type. Free entry of firms implies that∑
xX pi(x)Jx(0, 1)≤ K.
Now, let’s turn to the model with firm-level shocks and where exogenous firm death
rates depend on firm-level productivity, i.e. δ0(x).41 In analogy to Kaas and Kircher, we
solve the social planner version of the problem.42 The social value of the firm of type x
satisfies the Bellman equation
Gx(L, y;M) = max
(m,V ,s,δ)
{
F(L, y, x) −
N∑
i=1
biLi −
N∑
i=1
µi [Li + λ(mi)Vi] − f
−C(V ,L, y, x) + β(1 − δ)EyGx(L+, y+;M)
}
(5)
s.t. L+i = Li(1 − si) + miVi,∀i = 1, ...,N,
41Unlike Kaas and Kircher, we abstract from aggregate shocks, as this is not the focus of our analysis.
42For the type of production function and vacancy cost functions considered in the calibration below, it is
easy to show that the proof of Kaas and Kircher that the decentralized economy is efficient carries over the
case with ex-ante heterogeneous workers.
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and subject to δ ∈ [δ0(x), 1], si ∈ [s0, 1], mi ∈ [0, 1], and Vi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, ...,N, and where
M = (µ1, µ2, ..., µN) are the social values of each type of worker tied to the firm in a given
period. In our calibration, we set f = 0 and thus all firm exit is exogenous, i.e. δ = δ0(x). As
discussed in detail in Kaas and Kircher, the firm’s social flow value consists of the output
of the firm minus the opportunity cost of employment (biLi), the social cost of workers
tied to the firm, including the unemployed applying to the firm (µi [Li + λ(mi)Vi]), fixed
operating costs ( f ) and vacancy posting costs (C(V ,L, y, x)). Positive entry requires that∑
xX pi(x)Gx(0, 1;M)= K, which is satisfied in all calibrations that we explore. We solve the
model, by first forming an initial guess of M, then solving the Bellman equation above, and
then iterating on M until the resource constraints of the economy are satisfied with equality
(i.e., workers of all types are either employed or unemployed searching for a job).
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B.2 Calibrated Parameter Values and Additional Model Simulation Re-
sults
Table B1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description Target/Source
c 0.11 Vacancy cost scale parameter Weekly job filling rate of 0.102
γ 0.5 Vacancy cost elastiticity Job filling rates by employment growth
& Elasticity of hiring to job filling of 0.18
k 4.8 Matching function scale parameter Weekly job finding rate of 3.3 percent
r 0.56 Matching function elasticity Elasticity of job finding to tightness of 0.72
K 2.4 Entry cost Normalization
β 0.999 Discount factor Kaas and Kircher
b 0.1 Unemployment income Kaas and Kircher
s0 0.48% Quite rate Kaas and Kircher
x1 0.37 Firm productivity of firm type 1 Kaas and Kircher
x2 0.74 Firm productivity of firm type 2 Kaas and Kircher
x3 1.17 Firm productivity of firm type 3 Kaas and Kircher
x4 2.03 Firm productivity of firm type 4 Kaas and Kircher
x5 4.14 Firm productivity of firm type 5 Kaas and Kircher
σ1 98.820% Firm share at birth of firm type 1 Kaas and Kircher
σ2 1.000% Firm share at birth of firm type 2 Kaas and Kircher
σ3 0.153% Firm share at birth of firm type 3 Kaas and Kircher
σ4 0.025% Firm share at birth of firm type 4 Kaas and Kircher
σ5 0.002% Firm share at birth of firm type 5 Kaas and Kircher
δ0,1 1.710% Exogenous exit rate of firm type 1 Kaas and Kircher
δ0,2 0.270% Exogenous exit rate of firm type 2 Kaas and Kircher
δ0,3 0.160% Exogenous exit rate of firm type 3 Kaas and Kircher
δ0,4 0.088% Exogenous exit rate of firm type 4 Kaas and Kircher
δ0,5 0.016% Exogenous exit rate of firm type 5 Kaas and Kircher
y¯ 0.312 Transitory productivity range Kaas and Kircher
piy 0.027 Adjustment probability Kaas and Kircher
Table B2: Additional Simulation Results of Model of Kaas and Kircher with γ = 0.5
Data Baseline KK RR=0.98 y¯ = 0.5 piy = 0.5 s0 = 0.01  = 0.5
Key Model Elasticities:
Vac. dur. to starting wage 0.16 -17.9 -43.8 -239.5 -12.6 -19.3 -14.6 -11.3
Hiring to job filling rate 0.18 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.15
Calibration Targets:
Replacement Rate (RR) 0.72 0.70 0.98 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.72
Job Filling Rate 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Job Finding Rate 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: All simulations use a value of γ = 0.5. KK refers to the parameters in the baseline calibration of
Kaas and Kircher (2015), which targets the weekly job filling and job finding rate for U.S. data.
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Figure B1: Weekly Job Filling Rates by Employment Growth in Data and Model with Ex-
Ante Worker Heterogeneity without (Left Panel) and with (Right Panel) Positive Assortative
Matching
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